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ABSTRACT 
Chile is widely regarded to have emerged from its 1990 transition to democracy with the 
most restrictive rules of the game for its newly elected civilian leaders.  Nowhere were 
these rules more restrictive than with respect to the armed forces.  Most scholars were 
very pessimistic about the future of Chilean civil-military relations, although a few did 
anticipate that politicians would be able to overcome these restrictions over time.  Two 
decades after the transition, it appears that much success has been achieved. Is it now 
possible to say that Chile has developed strong civilian control of its armed forces?  If so, 
how did the predictions made in the years after the transition stack up against what has 
actually happened?  This thesis demonstrates that Chile has achieved what Pion-Berlin 
called “political management” of the military, and that there remain significant vestiges 
of the conditions left in place by Pinochet.  Moreover, this study finds that the optimistic 
projections, based as they were on rational choices by politicians, provide explanation not 
just for the advancements in civilian control, but also for the areas where there has been 
little or no improvement. 
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I. THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1990 TRANSITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One day after taking office as the first democratically elected president since the 
coup d’état seventeen years earlier, Patricio Aylwin struck a note of caution as he spoke 
to an otherwise celebratory crowd at Santiago’s Estadio Nacional.  “The satisfaction we 
feel today must not prevent us from seeing the innumerable limitations, obstacles, and 
restraints that the regime that governed until yesterday created in its attempt to perpetuate 
itself in power.”1  Clearly, not even the new president expected that Chilean democracy 
would be whole until the civilian government had overcome those same difficulties.  
Perhaps the most restrictive of these “rules of the game” left in place by Augusto 
Pinochet’s authoritarian machinery were those aimed at the institution from which the 
dictator had emerged seventeen years earlier—the military.  The armed forces were 
positioned to remain an independent and influential player in Chile’s governance for 
many years to come.  It stands to reason that the removal of those rules of the game that 
inhibited civilian control over the armed forces should mark a turning point in Chilean 
civil-military relations.  Now that two decades have passed since elected civilians took 
control, and many of those restrictions are no longer in their way, has the military been 
effectively subordinated to that control? 
Chile is often referred to as a superb test case for predictions of success and 
failure in a transition to democracy from military authoritarianism, having begun its 
transition at the opposite extreme from Argentina in terms of the relative strengths of the 
new civilian government and the armed forces.  Unlike in Chile, Argentina’s military 
junta left power after a disastrous series of domestic and foreign policy failures, 
culminating in economic crisis and the debacle that was the Falklands/Malvinas conflict 
with the United Kingdom.  Thanks to this inauspicious exit, the armed forces were 
relegated to an exceptionally weak political position as the civilian government took over 
 
1 Patricio Aylwin, "Patricio Aylwin Addresses Inaugural Rally," Daily Report: Latin America, March 
13, 1990, 35. 
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Argentina in 1983.2  Augusto Pinochet, on the other hand, left power largely on his own 
terms.  Although he did not anticipate leaving when he did, the transition itself was 
carried out under designs that he himself had formulated not even a decade earlier.  As 
will be seen, this meant that he and his cohort were able to keep substantial enclaves of 
power set aside for themselves, even as the nation began its move toward democracy. 
Given the analytical value of the Chilean case both in its own right and as a 
counterpoint to Argentina’s experience, numerous analysts offered regular updates on the 
progress of civil-military relations there during the first decade or so after the transition to 
democratic rule, some of them also providing their own forecasts as to the likely speed 
and effectiveness of future reforms.3  For obvious reasons, most of these early 
assessments were quite negative.  Since the earlier part of this decade, however, attention 
seems to have shifted away from these questions, possibly reflecting an assumption that, 
given Chile’s impressive economic performance and relative political stability, as well as 
the high-profile arrest and trial of General Pinochet, things must have continued on an 
upward path toward a strengthening of civilian authority as part of a broader 
consolidation of democracy there.  The military’s largely successful efforts in response to 
the earthquake of February 2010 only reinforced this notion. 
But was and is this a reasonable assumption?  This study will seek to answer two 
major questions.  First, has Chile successfully established civilian control of its armed 
forces?  What are the remaining vestiges of military autonomy?  Second, how accurate 
were the predictions of the trajectory of Chilean civil-military relations?  Was there 
variation in the levels of progress achieved, and, if so, how useful are those predictions to 
explain this variation? 
 
2 Felipe Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South 
America," Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 2 (November 1998):  390. 
3 See, for example, Mark Ensalaco, “In with the New, Out with the Old?  The Democratising Impact of 
Constitutional Reform in Chile,” Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no.2 (May 1994):  409–429; 
Wendy Hunter, “Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile:  Present Trends, Future 
Prospects,” in Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America, ed. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey 
Stark (Miami:  North-South Center Press, 1998), 299–322; Gregory Weeks, The Military and Politics in 
Postauthoritarian Chile (Tuscaloosa:  University of Alabama Press, 2004); and Peter M. Siavelis, “Chile:  
The End of the Unfinished Transition,” in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 3rd Ed., 
ed. Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 177–
208. 
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B. WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
The level of control that a government exerts over its armed forces is a recognized 
key measure of democratic consolidation.  Indeed, one could argue that military 
autonomy runs counter to the Weberian notion of the state, democratic or otherwise.  
How can a state claim a legitimate monopoly on the use of force if it cannot claim 
legitimate authority over the greatest instrument of coercion, the military?4  Within a 
more specific context, Linz and Stepan offer a useful three-part definition of a 
consolidated democracy, which sheds some light on the significance of civilian control of 
the military.  The three attributes of a completed transition are:  “first, that a government 
has to be in power as a result of a free and popular vote; second, that this government has 
authority to generate new policies; and, third, that the executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers generated by the democracy do not have to share power with other bodies de 
jure.”5  Clearly, an autonomous military, especially one that maintains significant 
influence on (and support from) the legislature, would place stringent limitations on the 
successful achievement of the second and third of these requirements, at a minimum.  
Linz and Stepan further point out that the question of whether or not that consolidation is 
complete is neither trivial nor merely academic, as it points to the willingness of the 
participants in that state to act within the constraints and structures of democracy.6  Thus, 
in order to determine the extent to which Chile has put its transition in the past, one must 
include an assessment of how much influence and autonomy the armed forces retain 
under current norms and institutions. 
Of course, the importance of this kind of analysis has been recognized by many 
researchers before, yet, the number of papers and articles treating this topic has dwindled 
since the early part of this decade, particularly among English-language publications.  
While this could be taken as a sign that there is nothing left to study, it would be wrong to 
make such an assumption, particularly given the consensus found in much of the research 
 
4 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in From Max Weber:  Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 
5 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore:  
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 207. 
6 Ibid., 207. 
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(as will be seen below) that Chile still had far to go on the path toward consolidation of 
its new democracy as of about a decade ago.  Five years after the most sweeping set of 
constitutional reforms since the transition was passed, it is thus worthwhile to ask 
whether those reforms, coupled with changes in military organization and mission, as 
well as evolving public perceptions of the military, have finalized the process of 
subjugation of the military, and what, if anything, remains to be done. 
C. BACKGROUND:  EVOLUTION TOWARD CIVILIAN DOMINANCE 
In spite of his defeats in the 1988 plebiscite and 1989 elections, Augusto Pinochet 
did not leave office from anything like the position of weakness in which the Argentine 
military found itself in 1983.  He still enjoyed the support of a significant portion of the 
population, as well as from crucial segments of the right-wing political elite.  Shrewd 
calculation and groundwork had gone into ensuring his continuing influence well beyond 
his term as president. 
The apparent level of civilian control of the armed forces as Chile moved from the 
Pinochet dictatorship into its modern democratic era did not offer much reason for 
optimism.  The constitution, which the ex-dictator himself had essentially written, 
remained in force (as it does to this day).  Within that document were three distinct 
realms of military autonomy:  a mission statement that endorsed the use of the military to 
enforce conformity with strict ideological guidelines, significant military presence in key 
positions throughout the government, and the exclusive power to hire and fire the top 
levels of military leadership.  Pinochet’s parting coup de grâce was the 1989 Ley 
Orgánica Constitucional de las Fuerzas Armadas (Organic Constitutional Law of the 
Armed Forces), which enshrined an additional two reserve domains of military power:  
final authority over military doctrine and education, plus mandated budgetary minimums 
for defense spending.  The latter of these was further reinforced by a secret law (ley 
reservada) that guaranteed a certain portion of the annual revenues from the state-owned 
copper company, CODELCO (though it should be pointed out that this law was on the 
books well before Pinochet came to power). 
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As will be demonstrated, these prerogatives were slowly reduced and, in many 
cases, eliminated by Chile’s democratically elected governments.  This slow but steady 
reining-in of the armed forces came about in spite of Pinochet’s political clout and the 
substantial barriers to reform that had been erected around the constitution and the 
organic law. 
Unfortunately, these prerogatives formed only a part of the larger group of 
“limitations, obstacles, and restraints” faced by civilian decision makers.  Three other 
areas are of interest in tracing the progress of civilian control in overcoming these 
barriers.  The first of these is the investigation and prosecution of human-rights 
violations.  Although President Aylwin made efforts to expose the many victims of 
Pinochet’s brutal repression in the first years of his administration, it would be several 
years before significant numbers of personnel were brought to justice for having 
committed those crimes, a process which continues even today.  The second additional 
area for study is the level of military contestation of civilian policies and actions.  While 
public commentary and even active protest against the government by members of the 
armed forces saw a spike in the first years after the transition, this phenomenon faded 
away fairly quickly.  Thirdly, one must study the development of the Ministry of 
Defense, which began in 1990 as a powerless and essentially administrative bureaucracy 
but eventually emerged as a significant and generally effective interlocutor between the 
president and the military leadership.  Recent legislation passed in Chile has instituted 
major organizational reforms aimed at the further consolidation of the Ministry, as well. 
Even assuming a best-case scenario in which all of the barriers mentioned above 
have been overcome, it is not sufficient to presume that civilian-control is consolidated.  
One must also find measures that can positively indicate the presence and strength of 
military subordination.  To do this, a look at Chilean civil-military relations in the last 
two decades is incomplete without an understanding of the changing nature of the roles 
and missions assigned to the armed services during that time.  Unlike in Argentina, where 
the armed forces underwent severe cutbacks in budgets, personnel, and operations after 
the transition, Chile’s military retained significant funding, and, in recent years, has even  
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expanded and modernized significantly.  Knowing where the Chilean military operates 
and who determines the definition and extent of those operations is crucial to 
understanding the status of civil-military relations. 
D. A SURVEY OF PREDICTIONS 
Analyses and predictions regarding the establishment of civilian control of the 
military in postauthoritarian Chile have generally fallen into two camps.  The first can be 
called a “modes of transition” or “founding conditions” approach.7  Scholars using this 
approach take the view that the conditions under which the transition occurred will 
largely define the likelihood of successful democratization.  The second approach, which 
I will refer to as the “electoral dynamics” model,8 argues that, even after a highly 
constrained transition such as Chile’s, civilian politicians in a new democracy will make 
the most of the options available to them within the given institutional framework in 
order to maximize both their own popular support and their influence in policies affecting 
the military.  Although none of the predictions made under these approaches was 
particularly optimistic, it is fair to say that the modes-of-transitions school is considerably 
more pessimistic than the electoral dynamics school in terms of the speed and 
effectiveness of reforms aimed at strengthening civilian control. 
Studies put forth by Felipe Agüero, Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, and others have 
concentrated on the conditions surrounding the transition from the military authoritarian 
regime to the democratic regime.  In Chile, those conditions placed exceptional 
constraints on the newly elected civilian politicians, even in the context of other such 
transitions in places like Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina.  Linz and Stepan called it “an 
extremely constrained transition and the most democratically ‘disloyal’ transfer of 
power” in the Southern Cone.9  Writing mostly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, these 
analysts attribute the perceived lack of substantial progress to this difficult starting point.  
 
7 Felipe Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining:  Civilians and the Military in Shaping 
Postauthoritarian Regimes,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America:  New Analytical Perspectives, ed. 
David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 195. 
8 Wendy Hunter, “Continuity or Change?  Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru,” 
Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 454. 
9 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 206. 
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It was no surprise, in other words, that Chile had not made particularly great strides 
toward subjugating the armed forces to civilian control. 
Agüero considers the current round of post-transition democratization in a broad 
historical setting.  Just as civil-military relations in most of twentieth century Chile were 
largely defined by the transition from the Ibáñez dictatorship, so they must be shaped by 
the transition from Pinochet’s regime.10  Although he largely avoids making predictions, 
he is clear in his assessment that the level of civilian supremacy is “low,” and that this is 
attributable to the very restrictive nature of the transition.11  Chile is the prime example 
of an institutionalized military regime, in which the “formal rules that regulate the power 
structure within the regime and the assignment of government functions to 
nonrepresentative or semirepresentative bodies, including the armed forces” have been 
enshrined in the state’s legal framework.12  The institutionalized nature of the Pinochet 
era had two broad effects.  First, it lent considerable solidarity to the armed forces as a 
powerful player in the transition to democracy.  Second, it cemented many of the 
structures that remained in place and untouched even after the transition, thus ensuring 
large measure of continuity in terms of military autonomy. 
Another Chilean scholar, Manuel Antonio Garretón, sharply criticizes the nature 
of the transition to civilian rule, calling it “incomplete,” and explaining that it had 
resulted, almost ten years later, “in a low-quality, restricted democracy, full of 
authoritarian enclaves.”13  Speaking mostly of the fallout from Pinochet’s arrest and the 
Chilean government’s mishandling (in his opinion) of the matter, he argues that without 
full reconciliation between the armed forces and society at large, democratization cannot 
be consolidated.  In his estimation, no such reconciliation is politically feasible. 
Writing only six years after the transition, Linz and Stepan present an equally 
gloomy picture of Chile’s civil-military relations.  In their estimation, Pinochet had done 
 
10 Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 195. 
11 Ibid., 208. 
12 Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions,” 386. 
13 Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Chile 1997–1998: The Revenge of Incomplete Democratization," 
International Affairs 75, no. 2 (April 1999): 260. 
 8
                                                
more than simply establish some very challenging rules for his democratic successors, 
and that, in fact, he had “a plan to rule via the constitution for at least another decade,” 
which they contend had for the most part worked out in Pinochet’s favor up to that 
point.14  They present a highly pessimistic scenario in which civilian politicians continue 
to delay reform efforts in the face of powerful resistance from the right, from Pinochet, 
and from the military.  Although this is not the only possibility they foresee for Chile, it 
is the one that dominates their conclusions.  If politicians continue to not only tolerate but 
to actually routinize the undemocratic practices in the 1980 constitution, that flawed 
document will be further legitimized, thus lowering the overall quality of Chile’s 
democracy in the years to come.15 
Mark Ensalaco presents a similarly negative outlook from about the same time 
period as Linz and Stepan, pointing to a “stalemate in Chilean civil-military relations,” 
wherein the majority of the prerogatives enshrined in the constitution remain in force and 
are not likely to change in the near future.16  In Ensalaco’s assessment, the strength of 
civilian opposition to the military prerogatives is matched by the power of military 
attitudes that support those same prerogatives.  Since the constitution itself makes it so 
difficult to enact reforms that run counter to the military’s interests, this situation “will 
not soon be resolved.”17 
Gregory Weeks, whose conclusions also fall squarely within the modes-of-
transition framework, counters the electoral dynamics argument by pointing out that the 
very institutions within which elected leaders must operate were, in many cases, shaped 
by the previous military regime, and thus often retain many undemocratic features.   As 
long as those institutions remain in place and do not demand that the armed forces play 
by the rules of the civilian leadership, then “institutional strength cannot be deemed  
 
 
14 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 205. 
15 Ibid., 217–218. 
16 Mark Ensalaco, “Military Prerogatives and the Stalemate of Chilean Civil-Military Relations,” 
Armed Forces & Society 21, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 268. 
17 Ibid., 268. 
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high.”  If the institutions in place to manage and direct the armed forces are not strong, he 
argues, then civilian control cannot be strong, either.  This, he maintains, was the case in 
Chile at the turn of this century. 18 
All of the authors from the modes-of-transition school, wittingly or not, have 
based their argument on what Collier and Collier called “critical junctures” and path-
dependency.  This is essentially the notion that the course of historical events, usually 
within a given state, can be traced back to a series of pivotal events.  In other words, 
certain crucial transitions or occurrences largely determine the way history will unfold.  
This broadly deterministic approach to historiography and social science focuses on the 
legacies of watershed changes as the major objects of study.  A critical juncture is defined 
as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different 
countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct 
legacies.”19  Those scholars that concentrate on the founding conditions of the new 
democratic era, therefore, necessarily opt to distinguish the characteristics of the pacted 
transition as the central determinants of Chile’s modern history. 
Contrary to the pessimism found in the literature from the proponents of the 
modes of transition, Wendy Hunter and Claudio Fuentes offer a more hopeful assessment 
of the prospects for successful establishment of civilian control of the armed forces under 
Chile’s new democracy.  Rather than focusing on the power of the military as an 
institution to defend its own interests and to maintain the status quo in terms of 
autonomy, these authors point to the ever-growing power of elected leaders to act in their 
own interests.  Using a rational choice approach to analyze the strategies of civilians in 
their interactions with the armed forces, this group sees the decisions made by democratic 
government officials as creating increasing leverage over the armed forces over time, 
rather than maintaining and fortifying the status quo. 
 
18 Gregory Weeks, “Democratic Institutions and Civil-Military Relations:  The Case of Chile,” 
Journal of Third World Studies 18, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 67. 
19 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena:  Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Notre Dame, Indiana:  University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2002), 29. 
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Hunter makes the strongest case for this approach.  She concludes that a 
democratic system is bound to reinforce civilian authority and weaken military 
autonomy.  While founding conditions are important as determinants of the rules of the 
game and the opening moves of civilian and military leaders, “initial institutional 
constraints do not create permanent limits to the expansion of democracy.”20  Further, as 
time goes on, those constraints become less and less critical.  The mechanisms driving 
this optimistic outlook are the rationally selected strategies crafted by politicians seeking 
to maximize their own popular support.  Thus, Hunter emphasizes the constraints that are 
placed on the military under a democratic regime, rather than the constraints placed on 
the civilians under a pacted transition.21 
Not every proponent of electoral dynamics paints quite so straightforward a 
picture as Hunter’s.  Fuentes, for instance, also concentrates on the strategies employed 
by civilian leadership toward the military, but he rejects the deterministic bent of Hunter.  
Instead, he “disagrees with the conclusion that a powerful and legitimate political system 
per se is capable of containing the military.”22  Nevertheless, he makes the argument that, 
ten years after the transition in Chile, important progress had been made toward 
diminishing the autonomy of the armed forces and improving the legal-institutional 
framework in which the civilian leadership would have to function in the future, in spite 
of the initial challenges they faced. 23 
It is important to point out that the two schools of thought sketched above do not 
necessarily stand in stark opposition to one another.24  Authors in both camps tend to 
 
20 Hunter, “Continuity or Change?” 474. 
21 Ibid., 474–475. 
22 Claudio Fuentes, “After Pinochet:  Civilian Policies Toward the Military in the 1990s Chilean 
Democracy,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000):  136. 
23 Ibid., 137. 
24 Nor do they represent the totality of potential explanations to be found in the literature.  Others have 
pointed to the positive impact on Chile’s civil-military relations resulting from external pressures, 
particularly with respect to the arrest, extradition, and trial of Pinochet.  Still others maintain that a key 
factor in Chile’s democratic consolidation has been its increasing regional integration, especially in 
Southern Cone defense policy coordination, which has served to simultaneously reorient the armed forces 
to a more “internationalist” mindset, while reducing the geopolitical threat (or at least the perception 
thereof) that the armed forces can leverage as a means of sustaining its size and influence. 
 11
                                                
point out that the other point of view does have something to contribute to the analysis at 
hand.  Agüero, for example, states that, beyond his founding conditions, “how actors 
either reaffirm or change those conditions to their advantage is also of critical 
importance.”25  For her part, Hunter agrees that the modes-of-transition school has made 
an important contribution, mostly toward defining the starting positions and first moves 
in the struggle to instill civilian dominance.26  What separates the two approaches, then, 
is not whether or not they accept that founding conditions or politicians’ actions will 
impact the shape of civil-military relations.  Rather, the distinction lies in the degree to 
which the individual scholar believes one or the other factor will dominate the process.  
Clearly, the modes-of-transition model anticipates that the starting conditions and the 
rules of the game at the outset will be the more important factor, whereas the electoral 
dynamics model expects rational choices made by politicians seeking to maximize their 
own power will naturally overcome whatever constraints may have been in place in the 
beginning.  The difference between the predictions and outlooks presented by each camp 
is, therefore, significant. 
In all of this, one must consider carefully, of course, just what sort of control is to 
be expected from civilian leaders in Latin American democracies.  David Pion-Berlin 
makes a significant contribution to this question in his Political Management of the 
Military in Latin America.  In it, he points out that nearly every one of the authors 
mentioned above takes as a given that elected politicians and the managers they appoint 
to oversee the armed services must seek to be favored not just by the balance of power, 
but also by the balance of competence in comparison to their uniformed counterparts.  
His point is that this expectation sets the bar unnecessarily high for a region in which 
external threats to security are not very strong and, in any event, are usually not dealt 
with in military terms.  Domestic political considerations necessarily mean that Latin 
American politicians have very little incentive to foster the training and 
professionalization of a civilian defense establish that parallels the experiences of senior 
military officers.  For states like Chile, then, effective civilian control need not imply that 
 
25 Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 196. 
26 Hunter, “Continuity or Change?” 474. 
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civilians have a greater (or even equal) level of expertise in issues such as strategy, 
defense planning, and budgeting.  What matters is that democratic governments are able 
to ensure that their armed forces follow the policies that they endorse.27 
Thomas Bruneau, responding to Pion-Berlin’s “political management” thesis, 
agrees with the central assertion that the most important factor in measuring civil-military 
relations in Latin America is the extent of military subordination to policies determined 
by civilian leadership.  He disagrees, however, with the notion that it is unfair to expect 
civilians to acquire expertise in matters of defense and national security.  Sufficient 
knowledge is crucial for those managers to be able to determine correct policies and to 
then supervise their implementation.28 
E. METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
The literature on Latin American civil-military relations, particularly those 
covering post-transition cases such as Chile, is replete with distinct methods of gauging 
civilian control of the armed forces.  The most common among these is the notion of 
military prerogatives, first presented in 1988 by Alfred Stepan, in an analysis of the 
Brazilian case.  He defines prerogatives as  
those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution 
assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to 
exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role 
within extramilitary areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure 
relationships between the state and political or civil society.29 
Thus, this framework looks more specifically at the military’s control over itself, 
as opposed to directly measuring the strength of civilian prerogatives over the military, so 
to speak.  Strong civilian control, in other words, can be defined in this model as the 
 
27 See David S. Pion-Berlin, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," Military 
Review 85, no. 1 (January/February 2005):  19–31.  See also David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, 
"Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America," Latin American Research 
Review 42, no. 3 (2007). 
28 Thomas C. Bruneau, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox 
Revisited," Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 19, no. 1 (January-June 2005):  111–131. 
29 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics:  Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 93. 
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absence or weakness of military prerogatives.  Connecting prerogatives, or guarantees, 
directly to the process of consolidating democracy, Agüero points out that “the assertion 
of civilian supremacy demands that guarantees initially given the military be reduced, 
replaced, or reformulated.”30  Given that all of the transitions to democracy from military 
dictatorships in Latin America featured substantial military prerogatives to varying 
degrees, it is no surprise that the majority of studies on this topic, especially those from 
the 1990s, use Stepan’s framework either exclusively or in conjunction with some 
additional measures.  There is, therefore, much utility in measuring the state of military 
prerogatives in Chile, particularly in view of the goal of comparing outcomes against 
predictions and assessments that were made using those same measures. 
As time went on and military prerogatives slowly diminished, scholars recognized 
that their absence did not always correctly indicate strong civilian control.  J. Samuel 
Fitch points out that one of the limitations of the prerogatives framework is that it defines 
civilian control by negation.  “It makes more sense,” he argues, “to define democratic 
civil-military relations affirmatively, by what they are rather than what they are not.”31  
Following this logic, Norden offers an alternative model of civilian control, which 
considers three dimensions:  domination, management, and authority.  Domination is here 
meant to connote the Weberian sense of an expectation that an order given is an order 
obeyed.  As she points out, though, domination may exist even in the context of 
significant military prerogatives.  At the next level of control, management consists of 
control over the corporate affairs of the armed forces, such as budgets and missions.  
Successful attainment of this level also demands that the government have a substantial 
civil-service component that is expert in these areas, and that is capable of directing other 
areas, including education and deployment preparations.  Finally, the most challenging 
dimension of civilian control is what Norden calls authority.  By this, she means that 
there exists a shared recognition among military and civilian leaders that the politicians 
and their appointed civilian policy-makers are the legitimate source of power over the 
 
30 Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 200. 
31 J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes Toward Democracy in Latin America:  How Do We Know If 
Anything Has Changed?” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America:  New Analytical Perspectives, ed. 
David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 62. 
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armed forces.  The normative shift required to achieve authority may take a great deal of 
time to come about.32  While Norden’s approach offers a nice illustration of the value of 
an “affirmative” definition of civilian control, it does not readily present the researcher 
with a practical set of measures that can be used to elaborate its terms in a specific case. 
Another affirmative definitional framework, and the one that I will employ to 
determine the overall extent of civilian control of the military in Chile, is Trinkunas’ 
concept of jurisdictional boundaries.  This model measures the level of military 
participation in four categories of state policy:  external defense, internal security, public 
policy, and state leadership selection.  Military participation in each category is coded as 
one of three possible levels:  military dominant, shared authority, and civilian dominant.  
Trinkunas argues that as higher levels of military participation are found in each of the 
four categories, the likelihood of successful consolidation of democracy decreases.  
Shared authority in state leadership selection, for example, is more threatening to 
democratization than is military dominance in external defense.  Effective civilian 
control, in turn, is defined in this framework as civilian dominance in all categories 
except external security, which may be coded as either civilian dominant or shared 
authority.33  Mapping the progression of Chile’s jurisdictional boundaries over the past 
two decades will be helpful in presenting a visual indication of the status of civilian 
control at regular intervals. 
F. PLAN OF THIS STUDY 
This paper will examine the trajectory of Chilean civil-military relations through a 
historical study of the evolution of civilian control of the armed forces since Pinochet 
stepped down from the presidency twenty years ago.  The analysis will begin in the next 
chapter by examining the fate of the many different barriers to effective civilian control 
described above.  Starting with the critical first measure of civil-military relations, 
 
32 Deborah Norden, “Civilian Authority without Civilian Dominance?  Assessing Venezuelan 
Political-Military Relations under Chávez,” Nueva Sociedad 213 (Enero-Febrero 2008):  4–6. 
33 Harold Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela,” in Civil-Military 
Relations in Latin America:  New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill:  University 
of North Carolina Press, 2001), 174–177. 
 15
military prerogatives, this chapter will then examine the evolution of the other three 
barriers discussed above:  the status of human rights cases and its impact on civilian 
control, the development of the Ministry of Defense, and the changes in military acts of 
contestation against government policies.  The subsequent chapter will assess in some 
depth the evolution of the roles and missions of the Chilean armed forces.  This portion 
of the study will, by necessity, include a look at some other important factors affecting 
the level of civilian control, namely the ongoing legacies of Chile’s geopolitical 
worldview and the military’s mode of identity. 
The final chapter will commence with a broad overview of the state of Chilean 
civil-military affairs, using Trinkunas’ framework of jurisdictional boundaries as a means 
of displaying these results visually.  Having established a comprehensive picture of the 
current state of civil-military relations in Chile and the extent to which one can say that 
there has been success in this case, I will end the study with an assessment of the 
applicability of the two major schools of thought (i.e., modes of transition and electoral 
dynamics) and the accuracy of their predictions with respect to Chile.  To do this, all of 
the measures looked at in the two preceding chapters will be analyzed as a group in order 
to find any patterns of variation in the level of progress achieved since 1990.  Those 
patterns will, in turn, be examined in light of the available predictive literature in order to 
understand how and where these frameworks apply to the historical evidence. 
G. SUMMARY 
This study will demonstrate that the negative predictions based on the modes of 
transition failed to accurately predict the trajectory of Chilean civil-military relations, and 
that the more optimistic expectations grounded in electoral dynamics were more effective 
in this regard.  As a result of the mostly positive achievements made over the past two 
decades, Chile has reached an irreversible political management of its armed forces.  
Significant obstacles to civilian control still exist, however, particularly in the form of the 
Copper Law and the constitutionally defined regimes of exception.  This final chapter 
will also demonstrate that, somewhat ironically, the electoral dynamics framework also 
helps to explain some of these areas where there is a lack of significant progress.  In an 
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interesting twist, it will further be seen that the path-dependency implicit in the modes-of-
transition framework is, in fact, most evident nowadays in two areas that were generally 
ignored by this body of literature—geopolitics and the traditional modes of military 
identity.  Both of these factors enjoy a hallowed place in Chilean history, and both were 
further cemented by the Pinochet regime.  Both of them also substantially inhibit 
effective civilian control of the military.  Neither seems likely to change very much in the 
coming years.  Chile’s current level of political management, then, will probably remain 
the status quo for some time to come. 
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II. BARRIERS TO PROGRESS:  OVERCOMING THE 
“LIMITATIONS, OBSTACLES, AND RESTRAINTS”  
A. INTRODUCTION 
When General Augusto Pinochet handed over the reins to a democratically 
elected regime in March of 1990, all signs pointed to a difficult way ahead for the 
consolidation of democracy in Chile.  Between Pinochet’s own constitution, which 
remained in force after he left office, and his last-minute maneuvering to ensure that he 
and his supporters in the military and on the far right continued to exert significant 
political influence, it seemed clear to most observers that the civilian leadership would 
have many obstacles to overcome as they worked to reestablish strong democratic 
institutions.  Chief among these challenges was the subjugation of the armed forces to 
civilian control.  What was not so clear to those same observers was just how hard it 
would be for Chileans to surmount these challenges, nor how long this might take. 
As recently as 2003, one scholar from the modes-of-transition school asserted that 
“the road to civilian supremacy over the armed forces in Chile is long, and the end is not 
yet in sight.”34  Just two years later, a sweeping set of constitutional reforms was passed 
that put Chile, in the eyes of yet another analyst, “again within the norm of democratic 
nations in terms of the role of its armed forces.”35  This chapter seeks to clarify the 
current state of this rapidly changing issue.  It will demonstrate that, although the 
pessimism found in the modes-of-transition literature may have been well-founded during 
the first decade of Chile’s new democracy, it did not account for some significant 
advances made toward overcoming the many barriers to progress that have confronted 
Chile’s civilian leaders since 1990. 
B. PREROGATIVES AND CONTESTATION IN CONTEXT 
This chapter will concentrate on Alfred Stepan’s concepts of military prerogatives 
and contestation in order to understand the evolution of modern Chilean civilian authority 
 
34  Weeks, The Military and Politics in Postauthoritarian Chile, 2. 
35 Siavelis, “Chile,” 199. 
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over the armed forces.  The focus on military prerogatives is not to ignore other important 
approaches to this complex issue.  Rather, it recognizes two important facts.  First, it is 
the same framework used, either wholly or at least in part, in the majority of the literature 
on the Chilean case.  Second, the presence and strength of military prerogatives is a 
critical first measure of civilian control. There is, therefore, much utility in measuring the 
state of military prerogatives in Chile, particularly in view of the goal of comparing 
outcomes against predictions and assessments that were made using those same 
measures. 
The centrality of military prerogatives notwithstanding, this paper will also 
consider three other factors that have been crucial in the Chilean case, but which cannot 
necessarily be classified as prerogatives.  Whether or not they meet Stepan’s definition of 
a prerogative, there can be little question that they fall under the rubric of barriers to 
effective civilian control of the military.  First, the question of responsibility for human 
rights abuses during the Pinochet era has played a critical role in shaping perceptions of 
the military’s subjugation to the rule of law, and thus to civilian authority.  The second of 
these factors will be the evolution of the Ministry of Defense, which has grown to 
exercise greater and greater control over the armed forces.  Finally, this study will 
analyze the other half of Stepan’s framework:  military contestation.  The level of 
contestation is a key indicator of the degree of agreement between the armed forces and 
the civilian government.36 
C. BACKGROUND:  MILITARY PREROGATIVES AS OF THE 1990 
TRANSITION 
The pacted transition to democracy that culminated in March of 1990 left some of 
the most restrictive “rules of the game” of any such transition in the world.  In the end, as 
the Aylwin administration took power in March of 1990, there were five military 
prerogatives in place, some weaker and some of them stronger.  Three of them were 
shrewdly put in place via the 1980 constitution.  Linz and Stepan argue that the intent 
behind, and the eventual outcome of, the 1980 document was, in effect, “a plan to rule via 
 
36 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 68. 
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the constitution for at least another decade” after the transition.37  In a similar 
interpretation, Agüero argues that Pinochet accomplished the “institutionalization” of his 
regime by way of his constitution.38  President Aylwin referred directly to this same 
design in his post-inaugural speech, as well.  Negotiations conducted after Pinochet’s 
defeat in the 1988 plebiscite served mostly to weaken military prerogatives,39 but they 
only went so far, and the opposition Concertación party had to make some concessions of 
its own, which further offset the effects of these pre-transition reforms.  Additionally, 
last-minute maneuvering by Pinochet, exemplified by the 1989 Organic Law of the 
Armed Forces, ensured that he and his allies on the right and in the military would 
continue to exert substantial influence for years to come.   
1. Constitutional Prerogatives and Barriers 
Approved under a plebiscite that was “characterized by fraud, intimidation, and 
the fear of expressing opposition,”40 Pinochet’s Constitution of Liberty formally enacted 
a number of crucial guarantees of military authority.  Mark Ensalaco identifies four 
distinct constitutional military prerogatives, of which this paper will consider three.41  
The first was the power to repress groups advocating subversive ideologies, meaning that 
the armed forces, whose mission was constitutionally designated to “guarantee the 
institutional order of the republic,” were empowered to enforce, in conjunction with the 
Constitutional Tribunal, conformity with strict guidelines of thought.42 
The second prerogative was the permanent presence of the armed forces in all 
branches of government.  In the legislature, the military was granted four of nine 
 
37 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 205. 
38 Felipe Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South 
America," Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 2 (November 1998):  386. 
39 Craig L. Arceneaux, Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern 
Cone and Brazil (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 101–107. 
40 Lisa Hilbink, Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship:  Lessons from Chile (New 
York:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), 131. 
41 Ensalaco, “Military Prerogatives,” 257. 
42 Hilbink, Judges beyond Politics, 133.  Article 8 made it illegal to promote “doctrines which attack 
the family, support violence, or hold a concept of society or the state that is totalitarian or based on class 
struggle.”  Ensalaco (1995: 259) points out that the irony inherent in this clause was not lost on many 
observers at the time. 
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designated (rather than elected) seats in the senate, to be filled by former chiefs of the 
three military services and the national police.  Pinochet also set aside another of these 
seats for himself, to be taken over in 1998, after he stepped down from command of the 
army.  The military was also given nominal control over two out of seven seats on the 
Constitutional Tribunal, a body that had powers of judicial review over legislation and 
constitutional reforms.  The sturdiest military foothold was in the form of its majority of 
seats on the National Security Council, which exerted powerful influence over the 
executive.43 
Finally, Ensalaco points to the inability of the president to fire any of the service 
chiefs (of which Pinochet would eventually become one) during their terms (normally 
four years long) as the third military prerogative enshrined in the 1980 constitution.  This 
rule, along with a transitory article that extended Pinochet’s term as armed forces chief to 
eight years, severely restricted the influence that the president would otherwise have had 
over his immediate military subordinates.44 
Recognizing that opposition forces would someday seek to attack these first three 
prerogatives, Pinochet erected a formidable series of bulwarks around them, making it 
exceptionally difficult to change the constitution.  Any constitutional amendment aimed 
at the military or its footholds in the government, the NSC and the Constitutional 
Tribunal, needed at least a two-thirds majority in both houses, and, further, had to meet 
that threshold during two consecutive legislative periods, thus requiring about eight years 
to enact any given constitutional amendment.45  Although Ensalaco makes the case for 
considering these barriers as a fourth prerogative, they are more accurately seen as 
defenses around the first three prerogatives. 
 
43 Ensalaco, “Military Prerogatives,” 260–261.  In spite of the frequency with which this point is made 
in the literature, both Sigmund (2003, 247) and Weeks (2003, 82–83) illustrate the inefficacy of the body.  
They point out that the military members of this Council only convoked one meeting, in 1992, and that 
even that attempt at contestation (in responsee to accusations of misconduct directed agains a general 
officer) resulted in a tie vote among the members, thus producing no official statement, and no practical 
effect. 
44 Ibid., 262. 
45 Ibid., 262–263. 
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Bargaining efforts by civilians from the Concertación alliance in the period before 
the election of Aylwin were successful in obtaining some key changes to the legal 
framework they were about to inherit, but they did not eliminate the constitutionally 
enacted prerogatives.  The most important victory for the opposition was a subtle, yet 
significant, change in the NSC’s charter, which reduced its powers such that it could 
merely hacer presente, or “make known,” its views only to the president, the congress, 
and the Constitutional Tribunal, rather than representar, or represent, those views directly 
to any other government body (e.g., the armed forces).  Further, one seat, to be filled by 
the civilian comptroller general, was added to the NSC, doing away with the de facto 
military majority in that body.  The strictures in Article 8 regarding constitutionally 
permitted ideologies were also eased considerably.  Additionally, although the nine 
designated senators were left in place, their influence was diluted by adding twelve new 
elected seats to the senate, for a total of thirty-eight.46  Finally, the barriers against reform 
were weakened by lowering the majority needed for constitutional amendments from 
two-thirds to three-fifths, and by eliminating the demand for passage during two 
consecutive legislative periods.47 
2. Prerogatives in the Organic Law 
Last-minute maneuvers by Pinochet before he handed over power added two 
more prerogatives to the three found in the constitution and further eroded the ability of 
future civilian governments to chip away at any military prerogatives.  The 1989 Organic 
Law of the Armed Forces, signed into law less than two weeks before Aylwin’s 1990 
inauguration, was part of a larger set of so-called leyes de amarre (binding laws) that, 
along with the constitution, provided the legal basis for continued influence for the 
pinochetistas after the transition.48  The law stipulated that the military budget shall 
never fall below the inflation-adjusted level at which it was in 1989.  What is more, under 
a secret law (ley reservada) passed well before Pinochet came to power, the state-owned 
 
46 Weeks, The Military and Politics, 53. 
47 Siavelis, “Chile,” 193. 
48 Arceneaux, Bounded Missions, 102. 
 22
                                                
copper company, CODELCO, was obligated to contribute 10 percent of its annual 
revenues from exports directly to the armed forces.49  Pinochet considerably strengthened 
the military’s benefit from the copper law in 1985, under yet another ley reservada that 
doubled the minimum payoff guaranteed annually to the three armed services from 
US$90 million to US$180 million.50  (Recent returns from copper revenues, however, 
have rendered even this higher floor irrelevantly low.)  Formally enacted behind a series 
of barriers that inhibited their modification, these guarantees amounted to a military 
prerogative, since they effectively took away from civilian leaders the ability to cut 
military spending as they might see fit. 
The organic law also gave Pinochet, in his role as chief of the armed forces, one 
additional prerogative, in the form of control over military education and doctrine.  The 
president’s lack of control over senior personnel was deepened, as the military head of 
the armed forces was also bestowed with the power to make all nominations to the rank 
of major general, thus making him a “gatekeeper” to the ranks from which the service 
chiefs were culled. 51 
Other roadblocks in the way of future reforms came along with Pinochet’s final 
machinations.  Any potential changes to the organic law would have to get past the 
already-stacked Constitutional Tribunal before passage.52  Additionally, the outgoing 
dictator successfully packed the Supreme Court, installing seven sympathetic young 
justices (who serve lifetime terms on the bench) by offering to the aging former justices a 
sweetheart retirement deal, via the so-called ley de caramelo.53 
 
49 Hunter, “Continuity or Change?” 459. 
50 Wendy Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military's Role in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, Peaceworks No. 10 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 30.  See 
also Alex Sanchez, Chile’s Aggressive Military Arm Purchases Are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in 
Particular Bolivia, Peru and Argentina, Report, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Washington: COHA, 7 
August 2007). 
51 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 209. 
52 Ibid., 209. 
53 Hilbink, Judges beyond Politics, 159. 
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3. Summary 
Seen through the lens of Stepan’s military prerogatives, it is clear that in 1990 the 
armed forces were nicely positioned to weather the storm of democratization while 
maintaining their autonomy for a long time to come.  All three of the military 
prerogatives in the constitution came through the first reform efforts in weaker, but still 
meaningful forms.  Pinochet had secured significant powers for the next eight years that 
otherwise would have belonged to the civilian president.  Finally, formidable barriers 
stood in the way of any attempt by future governments to do away with any of these 
prerogatives. 
D. AFTER THE TRANSITION:  THE FATE OF THE MILITARY 
PREROGATIVES 
Though they may have come slowly, reforms and amendments to the highly 
restrictive laws put in place by Pinochet did come over time, gradually eliminating most 
of the formally enacted military prerogatives.  This was the “single most important issue 
for the recapture of Chilean democracy.”54  Building on the modest success of the 1989 
reform efforts, civilian political leaders continued the “cautious and incremental 
process”55 through a sequence of consensual reforms, and were thus able to remove most 
of the military prerogatives from the law of the land.  Each of the prerogatives will be 
discussed in turn below. 
1. The Right to Repress 
The constitutionally mandated ability of the state to repress subversive thought by 
way of the Constitutional Tribunal and the armed forces has all but disappeared.  Gone 
from the constitution are references to institutional order.  Instead, the armed forces now 
“exist for the defense of the fatherland and are essential for the national security.”56  
Article 8 now limits itself to a discussion of terrorism, rather than of unacceptable 
 
54 Ensalaco, “In with the New, Out with the Old?”  423. 
55 Ibid., 410. 
56 Constitución Política de la República de Chile de 1980, 28 October 2009, available from 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=242302, internet; accessed 15 December 2009. 
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ideologies, as it once did.  Further, the control of the national police, once in the hands of 
the armed forces chief, was moved to a new sub-ministry, thus reducing military 
participation in internal security matters.57  It is thus reasonable to conclude that this 
prerogative has been mostly eliminated.  In the next chapter, it will be seen, however, that 
certain aspects of this prerogative remain in place. 
2. Military Presence in the Government 
Here again, changes to the constitution have erased most of the vestiges of 
military participation in policy-making.  In the legislature, the four senate seats reserved 
for former service chiefs (along with all other designated seats) were eliminated in the 
2005 reforms.58  Influence over the judiciary, previously exercised via the Constitutional 
Tribunal, was also eliminated in the 2005 reforms, which divided control over the 
Tribunal’s seats nearly evenly among the three branches of government.  Of the ten 
members of that body, four are now elected by the legislature, and three each by the 
president and the Supreme Court.59 
Perhaps the single greatest blow to military influence over the government came 
with the major overhaul of the National Security Council in 2005.  As part of that effort, 
the NSC was stripped of any decision-making powers.  It is now strictly an advisory 
body, presided over by the president himself, and convoked solely at his discretion.  The 
military service chiefs now constitute a minority of the membership, as well.60  With 
these changes, the NSC is no longer anything more than a source of advice to the 
president alone.  Military presence and influence in the government beyond the armed 
forces has thus been effectively closed off. 
 
57 Marcos Robledo, "Democratic Consolidation in Chilean Civil-Military Relations: 1990–2005," in 
Global Politics of Defense Reform, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, 95–126 (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 108. 
58 Siavelis, “Chile,” 194. 
59 Constitución Política, Article 92a), b), and c). 
60 Constitución Política, Article 106; and Robledo, “Chilean Civil-Military Relations,” 108–109. 
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3. Presidential Control Over Senior Officers 
The hiring and firing of service chiefs was not officially placed in the president’s 
hands until the signing of the 2005 reform package.61  Combined with Pinochet’s 
departure from office as the chief of the armed forces in 1998, effective control over 
high-level promotions, and appointments to and removals from high posts have all 
effectively moved under civilian control, thus eliminating this prerogative. 
4. Budgetary Controls 
The legally mandated minimum budget level, set to remain equal to the 1989 
level, adjusted for inflation, has not changed.62  Nor has the 10 percent contribution from 
the profits of CODELCO been altered since the transition.  Nevertheless, Hunter points 
out that the 1989 equivalency has essentially served to lock military spending at that 
level, citing significant growth in other spending areas, while the defense budget has 
stagnated.63  More recent data demonstrate that this informal workaround of sorts 
continues to manifest in modern Chilean defense policy.64 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the funding from CODELCO presents a 
much more vexing issue in terms of civilian control.  Even with ostensible authorizations 
by the executive on most major military purchases, the mere fact of this guaranteed 
funding (particularly when copper prices are relatively high) places military budgets 
beyond civilian control.  As Jeanne Giraldo points out, “government preferences are more 
likely to be taken into account when they are backed by the provision or withholding of 
resources.”65  Obviously, huge amounts of reserve funding make it impossible for 
civilians to wield such powers.  However, a bill is now being considered that would do 
 
61 Robledo, “Chilean Civil–Military Relations,” 108. 
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http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=30318, internet; accessed December 15, 2009:  Article 96(99). 
63 Hunter, “Continuity or Change?” 459–460. 
64 Compare the decrease in defense spending cited by Hunter (1997: 459) from 1989 (11.34% of 
national budget) to 1995 (8.65%) with the level of 2008 (8.49%) (see Marcela Donadio and María de la Paz 
Tibiletti, ed., A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America, 2008 ed. (Buenos Aires:  Red de 
Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina, 2008), 145). 
65 Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, Defense Budgets and Civilian Oversight, Occasional Paper #9, The Center 
for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: CCMR, June 2001), 5. 
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away with the CODELCO funding requirement, and there is visible political momentum 
in favor of its passage.66  Civilian leaders have thus rendered moot this prerogative, 
although work remains to be done to formalize this situation. 
5. Military Education and Doctrine 
The control of military education remains formally within the purview of each 
service chief.67  However, Robledo argues that civilian leaders have managed to establish 
considerable influence in this arena.  He points out that each of the services has, over the 
past two decades, increasingly brought its own doctrine and educational policies more 
and more in line with defense policy white papers signed by the president and the 
minister of defense.68  It will be demonstrated in the next chapter, however, that those 
white papers are of only limited value as measures of civilian authority over the military.  
Military officers have played a significant, if not dominant, role played in the formulation 
of these documents, and they continue to display a number of troubling vestiges of 
traditional military identity and a strongly militaristic geopolitical worldview.  Not unlike 
the budgetary prerogative, then, military autonomy over education and doctrine has 
weakened since 1990, but only to a certain degree.  Legal reforms and a more difficult 
cultural shift are needed if this prerogative is to be fully eliminated. 
6. Barriers to Future Reforms 
Although not, strictly speaking, a military prerogative, it is nonetheless worth 
noting that democratic leaders have, since 1990, made it even easier to change the 
constitution and the organic laws.  As part of the 2005 reforms, the majority required for 
passage of amendments to the constitution was lowered again, this time to four-
sevenths.69 Given the weakening of these barriers that came with the 1989 reform 
 
66 See Javiera Olivares M., “Ley Reservada del Cobre vive sus últimos días,” La Nación (September 9, 
2009), http://www.lanacion.cl/ley-reservada-del-cobre-vive-sus-ultimos-dias/noticias/2009-09-
09/020001.html (accessed December 17, 2009); and El Mercurio, "Piñera: "La tragedia no nos apartará de 
cumplir nuestro programa de gobierno," May 21, 2010. 
67 Ley Orgánica Constitucional de las Fuerzas Armadas, Article 18(19). 
68 Robledo, “Chilean Civil-Military Relations,” 112–113. 
69 Siavelis, “Chile,” 194. 
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package and the impressive number of constitutional reforms that have been passed since 
the transition, it is fair to say that these barriers now strike a correct balance between 
protecting the document from frivolous changes and allowing important reforms.  
7. Summary 
Substantial progress has been made on all most of the five prerogatives identified 
during the transition.  Of these, all three of the constitutionally mandated prerogatives 
have been eliminated.  Strong civilian control over military budgets and over doctrine and 
education remains problematic, on the other hand.  The stipulations of the Organic Law 
of the Armed Forces, have, at best, been sidestepped by politicians, and only in an 
informal manner.  The articles of that law pertaining to these latter two prerogatives have 
not been altered, perhaps due to a lack of perceived need, given that they have not posed 
significant difficulties to politicians in recent years.  Political momentum in favor of 
eliminating the copper contribution indicates that progress may be forthcoming on this 
issue.  The unfortunate fact remains, however, that it has already had a hugely negative 
impact on civilian oversight of defense budgets.  The next chapter will explore the 
additional negative ramifications of this situation on Chile’s foreign relations. 
E. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:  HUMAN RIGHTS, THE MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE, AND CONTESTATION 
A number of factors beyond the military prerogatives analyzed above deserve 
mention in a discussion of the trajectory of civil-military relations in Chile.  The first of 
these is human rights and the accountability of the armed forces.  From there, the analysis 
will turn to military contestation, the other half of Stepan’s framework.  Finally, some 
comments on the status of the Ministry of Defense will be offered. 
1. Human Rights 
The amnesty extended to members of the armed forces for violations of human 
rights between 1973 and 1978 ought not be thought of as a prerogative.70  Still, it did 
 
70 Claudio Fuentes would disagree (see Fuentes, “After Pinochet,” 118), but I contend that the amnesty 
does not fit within Stepan’s definition, as it does not constitute a license to commit further violations, nor 
does it concern military autonomy, strictly speaking. 
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lend itself to a perception that the military remained above or outside of the rule of law 
even after the transition to democratic rule.  A number of events during the first decade 
after the transition served to make clear the evolving nature of civilian authority with 
respect to its ability to hold the military accountable for its criminal actions under the 
authoritarian regime. 
The first was the 1993 verdict by the Supreme Court that found General Manuel 
Contreras guilty of planning the execution of Orlando Letelier.  After withstanding two 
years’ worth of appeals, the conviction led to a seven-year sentence.  The case was a 
limited demonstration of progress, given the exceptional nature of the judges’ waiver of 
the amnesty law and the more than four-month standoff between the executive and the 
military that it ignited.71  However, it was an important first example of a high-ranking 
officer being taken to task by the democratic government. 
By far the most significant advance in the realm of human rights came about even 
before 1998, when Pinochet was arrested in London.  Using two important lines of 
reasoning, judges began to rule that amnesty could not be applied in a number of high-
profile cases.  First, since amnesty was meant to pardon individuals already found guilty, 
the Supreme Court ruled for the first time in 1997 that it could not be invoked to prevent 
the investigation and prosecution of a crime.  In 1998, the same body held that, since 
cases of disappearances were ongoing crimes and thus fell outside of the five-year 
window covered by the amnesty law, they must be classified as kidnappings and 
therefore must also be investigated.72 
These rulings established the precedent under which Pinochet himself was soon to 
be indicted, although he avoided standing trial.  In spite of that shortcoming, numerous 
other officers (including, for a second time, Contreras) have been sentenced for human 
rights abuses carried out in the name of the authoritarian regime, while hundreds more 
officers are still undergoing trials.73  Imperfect and incomplete as the results are bound to 
 
71 Hilbink, Judges beyond Politics, 196–197. 
72 Ibid., 199. 
73 Robledo, “Chilean Civil-Military Relations,” 110. 
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be, the curtain of amnesty has clearly been lifted, and all, including the military,74 have 
agreed on the way forward for human rights trials. 
2. The Development of the Ministry of Defense 
The Ministry of Defense in 1990 was a shell of an organization.  Gregory Weeks 
explains that, under Pinochet, a president who doubled as a general and the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces, the ministry had become a backwater where few decisions 
were made.  During the first decade of civilian rule, senior military leaders continued to 
disregard the ministry as a channel of communication with the president, and the minister 
was routinely left on the sidelines as issues unfolded.  The conflict initiated with the 
ejercicio de enlace in 1990 was the first clear demonstration of this trend, as Pinochet 
insisted on negotiating directly with the president to bring the matter to resolution.  
1993’s boinazo incident came about partly as a result of the military’s frustration with 
administrative backlogs in the ministry.  As recently as 2001, Weeks declared that the 
Ministry of Defense “cannot yet be considered an effective political institution for civil-
military relations.”75 
Yet, change was already underway even then.  The negotiations over the status of 
General Contreras after his sentencing in 1995 were handled through the minister of 
defense.76  This trend continued, as Lagos managed to leverage the ministry in his 
negotiations with military leaders over the 2001 constitutional reform package.77  
Michelle Bachelet, appointed as the first female minister of defense in Latin American 
history, reinforced this development, “winning her first grudging acceptance and later 
outright praise from military authorities.”78  Though largely symbolic and anecdotal, 
Bachelet’s successful relationship with military leaders was illustrative of a trend toward 
an improved position for the Minister of Defense. 
 
74 Siavelis, “Chile,” 199. 
75 Weeks, “Democratic Institutions and Civil-Military Relations,” 70–72. 
76 Ibid., 71. 
77 Robledo, “Chilean Civil-Military Relations,” 107. 
78 Siavelis, “Chile,” 198. 
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More recently, “the most ambitious defense reform since the post-World War II 
reorganization”79 was signed into law in February of 2010.  Passage of this legislation 
was no mean feat, given that it languished in debate for more than four years, unable to 
garner the political attention it needed in order to be passed into law.  Important elements 
include the creation of a Joint Chief of Staff and the concomitant development of joint 
doctrine, the elimination of portions of the ministry that have grown irrelevant over the 
years, and the establishment of two undersecretaries (“of defense” and “of the armed 
forces”) who handle defense policy and administrative matters, respectively.80  A report 
by the Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL, Latin American 
Security and Defense Network) highlights the consensual and slow process that went into 
the development of this project, including as it did the inputs of senior military officers.  
Importantly, this law also clearly defines the position of the Minister of Defense in the 
chain of command, acting at all times (at peace, in crisis, or at war) as a superior to the 
chiefs of the various services.  The result, according to RESDAL, is an updated ministry 
that can “exercise genuine civilian leadership and control over the armed forces.”81  
While the passage of this most recent legislation certainly gives reason to be optimistic 
regarding the capacity of Chile’s Ministry of Defense, only time can tell if the changes it 
brings actually render the organization something more than the largely administrative 
body that it currently is. 
3. Contestation by the Armed Forces 
If, as Alfred Stepan argues, military contestation is a barometer for the level of 
disagreement that exists between the armed forces and a new democratic government, 
then Chile’s gauge registered significant peaks during the first years after the transition, 
but eventually settled at a low level.  The first year of the new regime had not come to a 
 
79 Robledo, “Chilean Civil-Military Relations,” 114. 
80 Claudio Ortiz Lazo, “Modernization of the Ministry of Defence,” in A Comparative Atlas of 
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81  See Miguel Navarro, Metodología para el Análisis de los Ministerios de Defensa: El Caso Chile, 
Report, Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (Buenos Aires: RESDAL, November 2009), 
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close before the first serious crisis, known euphemistically as the “ejercicio de enlace,” 
exploded.  Stemming primarily from a fraud investigation against the general’s son, this 
event was a clear demonstration of Pinochet’s willingness to use the army as his personal 
defender, and of the army’s willingness to act in that capacity.   
When the findings of the Rettig Commission were published just a few months 
later, in March of 1991, leaders of all three military services issued public statements that 
variously repudiated the findings, attempted to justify the human rights abuses, and 
declared solidarity with their commander-in-chief, Pinochet.82  Given the toothless nature 
of the commission’s assignment to merely identify victims, this act paled in comparison 
with the next contestation event, the boinazo.  Responding to the reemergence of his 
son’s fraud investigation, and to other frustrations with the Ministry of Defense (and thus 
with President Aylwin), Pinochet deployed dozens of armed commandos in front of his 
Santiago headquarters, as he and a cadre of generals held a meeting inside the building.  
The crisis was resolved without violence in a matter of days, with the army winning a 
number of significant political victories.83  The army’s response to General Contreras’ 
sentencing in 1995 was the last major crisis of contestation.  After a nearly five-month 
stand-off, the army, which had maintained custody of the general, handed him over to 
government authorities in exchange for still more political concessions, including a pay 
raise.84 
In spite of these initial outbursts of protests, since 1995, the armed forces have 
passed up a number of opportunities to demonstrate their collective dissatisfaction with 
the policies and actions of the civilian government. Importantly, there were no significant 
acts of protest from the military in response either to Pinochet’s arrest and indictment, or 
to the sweeping constitutional reforms of 2005.  Instead, the armed forces remained quiet, 
and even expressed support for the civilian administration.  It might be argued that a lack 
 
82 Weeks, The Military and Politics, 73–74. 
83 See Weeks, The Military and Politics, 83–90; and Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions: 
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of contestation is merely a reflection of the conformity of civilian-generated policies with 
military thinking.  Nonetheless, the prolonged period of institutional silence is a strong 
indicator of a newly acquiescent military, one which is satisfied to respect the decisions 
of its civilian masters. 
F. CONCLUSION:  THE STATE OF THE BARRIERS TODAY 
The bulk of the factors reviewed in this chapter paint a fairly bright picture of 
civil-military relations in Chile as of 2010.  All of the prerogatives enshrined in 
Pinochet’s 1980 constitution have been eliminated, and the extraordinary hurdles that 
once inhibited reform of the constitution have been sufficiently weakened to allow further 
changes as civilian leaders see fit.  Politicians have managed to develop informal ways to 
sidestep the two other prerogatives through interpretation and application of the 
budgetary requirements, and through an evident and growing cooperation on the part of 
the armed forces in their elaboration of service-specific educational systems and doctrine.  
Further, much progress has been made toward bringing to justice those who violated 
human rights under Pinochet.  The Ministry of Defense has established itself as a credible 
superior over the armed forces, particularly after the recent legislation aimed at the 
modernization and overhaul of this agency.  Finally, public acts of contestation have all 
but ended. 
In spite of Chile’s remaining challenges, and notwithstanding the areas for further 
study outlined above, there seems little doubt that civil-military relations have overcome 
many of the enormous obstacles set in place before the transition to democracy, and that 
civilian control today is remarkably strong.  Of the three attributes of a consolidated 
democracy discussed earlier, only the second, government authority to generate new 
policies, remains to be fully realized.  The changes that have occurred unquestionably 
took place in spite of the remarkably constrained framework that the civilian 
administration inherited from Pinochet, thus calling into question the predictions of the 
modes-of-transition analyses.  While that approach did contribute to a more thorough 
understanding of the difficulties that lay ahead for democratic leaders in 1990, it did not 
offer a useful way to explain the speed and success of the consolidation since then. 
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One must be careful not to overstate the case, of course.  As has been discussed 
above, much work remains to be done.  Evidence of effective cooperation between the 
armed forces and the Ministry of Defense is somewhat anecdotal, and is founded upon a 
document (the defense white paper) that is of questionable practical value, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter. Furthermore, if civilian governments are to truly 
control the military in Chile, the problems with the Organic Law of the Armed Forces 
must be addressed.  Whatever the role of the white papers, though, oversight of education 
and doctrinal decisions must be formally assigned to civilian leadership in the Ministry of 
Defense.  What is more, minimum funding levels should be removed from the law and 
placed in the hands of policy-makers.  The ley reservada del cobre, meanwhile, demands 
political attention.  More than a floor on funding, what the secret copper law guarantees 
is a ceiling on civilian oversight of defense budgets.  It is perhaps the greatest single 
remaining obstacle to effective subordination of the armed forces in Chile.  The proposal 
to eliminate this guarantee is a worthy effort. 
As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, it is not sufficient to examine just 
the barriers that stand in the way of Chile’s civil-military relations.  In the next chapter, 
this study turns to an analysis of the evolution of the roles and missions of the armed 
forces, and how they have impacted civil-military relations.  Given that so many barriers 
have been removed, and others simple sidestepped by politicians, do the activities of the 
military services bear out the more or less optimistic conclusions of this chapter? 
 34
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 35
                                                
III. ONE FOOT STILL IN THE PAST:  MILITARY ROLES AND 
MISSIONS SINCE 1990 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Thanks mostly to the numerous barriers to civilian control left in place by 
Pinochet, the armed forces were positioned to remain an independent and influential 
player in Chile’s governance for many years to come.  It stands to reason that the removal 
of those rules of the game that inhibited civilian control over the armed forces should 
mark a turning point in Chilean civil-military relations.   Now that two decades have 
passed since elected civilians took control, and many of those restrictions are no longer in 
their way, has the military been effectively subordinated to that control?  As was noted in 
the introduction, it is not enough to examine Stepan’s prerogatives and contestation in 
order to develop a full understanding of a nation’s civil-military relations.   This chapter 
will therefore continue the analysis of civilian control in Chile by examining the level of 
participation of the armed forces in various areas of state activity and, perhaps more 
importantly, determining who governs those activities. 
The preceding chapter demonstrated that things have unquestionably changed in 
the twenty years since President Aylwin made clear the contribution that elimination of 
the restraints on government control of the armed forces would make toward his 
country’s successful democratization.  As was discussed in that chapter, the major round 
of constitutional reforms signed into being in 2005 marked the most recent and most 
substantial step (with the possible exception of the brand new reforms to the Ministry of 
Defense) toward the elimination of the obstacles in the way of the subjugation of the 
military.  Now that so many of the “limitations, obstacles, and restraints” that inhibited 
civilian control of Chile’s armed forces have been removed from the path toward 
consolidation, the question remains as to whether that civilian control is in place.  Samuel 
Fitch points out that an overemphasis on the rules of the game tends to disguise other, 
equally important indicators of effective civil-military relations.85  One of the most 
 
85 Fitch, "Military Attitudes Toward Democracy in Latin America," 62. 
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important among these other measures is the roles and missions assigned to the armed 
forces.86  Put simply, it is at least as important to know what the military actually does, 
and who tells them to do it, as it is to understand the various rules that constrain the 
interaction between the military and its civilian masters.  This chapter seeks to examine 
how the roles and missions assigned to Chile’s armed forces have reflected and 
influenced (in a mutually dependent fashion) changing levels of civilian control since the 
democratic transition of 1990.  Specifically, how have those missions changed over the 
past two decades?  Who has controlled the decisions regarding the assignment of those 
missions?  Finally, how have the roles and missions reflected the evolving worldviews of 
civilian and military leadership?  This last question is crucial, as it points to the level of 
cooperation or divergence between officers and politicians in the determination of 
military missions. 
In seeking answers to these questions, this study will begin with an analysis of the 
official statements of the roles and missions of the armed forces found in the constitution 
and the defense white papers.  After a discussion of these formal delineations, the paper 
will then turn to an examination of the employment of the military services in external 
and internal activities. Throughout, the analysis will concentrate on the nature of military 
identities and worldviews that these roles and missions reflect, and how these questions 
have impacted the crucial question of who governs the determination of those activities. 
This chapter will demonstrate that, notwithstanding the progress made in 
eliminating the barriers to civilian control since 1990, the roles and missions of the 
modern Chilean armed forces present an ambiguous image of civil-military relations.  An 
emerging pattern of internationalism in Chile’s foreign policy appears to have been 
adopted by officers and politicians, leading to the solidification of the military’s 
constitutionally defined external role through such missions as peacekeeping and regional 
cooperation.  Nevertheless, this encouraging sign is contrasted with considerable vestiges 
of traditional perceptions of the military’s identity, as well as the continued influence of a 
geopolitical outlook evident among decision-makers in and out of uniform. 
 
86 See Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin America, vii. 
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1. Definitions 
For the working definitions of roles and missions, this paper will borrow those 
offered by Wendy Hunter, with some modifications.  By role is meant the “principle 
orientation of the armed forces.”  This orientation is most commonly explained as lying 
somewhere along a simple continuum between “external” and “internal,” although 
Hunter add to this another dimension – that of politicization and involvement in state 
decision-making.  Missions are defined as “the specific tasks assigned to the armed 
forces.”  Within this construct, missions essentially serve as the ingredients that combine 
to characterize the overall role of the armed forces.87  Notwithstanding the validity of this 
“bottom-up” approach to defining roles from a pragmatic standpoint, it is important to 
consider, in addition to the constituent missions, any roles formally and explicitly 
assigned to the military by the government.  These are typically promulgated by means of 
the constitution and other official documents, such as defense white papers.88 
From an analytical perspective, the centrality of roles and missions in 
understanding civil-military relations is one of the few points of real consensus in the 
literature.  From there, analysts tend to diverge into two different camps, broadly 
speaking.  As will be described below, some scholars consider that what matters most is 
types of roles and missions, while others maintain that the crucial factor is not the sort of 
missions taken on by the armed forces, but rather who decided what those missions 
would be. 
It is here that one finds a key distinction between the two studies drawn upon 
above to define “roles” and “missions.”  Hunter draws an analytical line between military 
subordination to civilian authority on the one hand, and the nature of the military’s role 
on the other.  Put more clearly, “strong civilian control is difficult to sustain when the 
armed forces are oriented mainly toward internal conflict.”89  Michael Desch, upon 
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whose work Hunter draws, says that internal missions necessarily affect the military 
structure in such a way that they become less manageable for civilians.90  By implication, 
roles and missions are not themselves indicators of the strength of civil-military relations.  
Instead, mission type and subordination are mutually dependent variables.  In any event, 
the employment of the armed forces for managing internal security, according to both 
Hunter and Desch, is necessarily damaging to civilian control.  Even if a country displays 
effectiveness in civil-military relations, it risks damaging that condition if it assigns 
internal roles to the armed forces. 
On the other hand, Pion-Berlin maintains that, contrary to the conventional 
thinking (exemplified by Hunter), “internal missions are not inherently risky, nor are they 
more perilous than external missions.”[emphasis in the original]  The critical question for 
him is rather who determines the roles and missions that the armed forces have.91  After 
all, if military officers have the final say as to what their jobs are, then distinctions 
between internal and external missions and orientations become much less important. 
These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, however.  Combining them, 
this paper will use the following definition: The roles and missions of the armed forces 
indicate effective civil-military relations when they are externally oriented, and when 
they have been determined and promulgated by civilian authorities.  An external 
orientation cannot reasonably exclude internal missions (such as crisis response and some 
support functions) altogether, but it should rule out political involvement.  Similarly, to 
say that civilians have determined these roles and missions must not proscribe military 
involvement in their formation; the “balance of power” in the process must, however, 
favor civilians. 
 
90 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment 
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B. FORMAL DEFINITIONS:  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DEFENSE 
WHITE PAPERS 
1. The Constitution 
The first place one must turn when seeking to outline the roles and missions 
assigned to the Chilean armed forces is the constitution.  The importance of this “secular 
sacrament” (to borrow Brian Loveman’s phrase)92 in this particular case goes beyond the 
truism that constitutions form the bedrock of national law and policy.  Paul E. Sigmund 
notes that Chileans, both civilian and military, have historically demonstrated “a strong 
commitment to legalism, professionalism, and constitutionalism.”93  Even Augusto 
Pinochet went to great lengths (however undemocratic the actual process might have 
been)94 to shroud his dictatorship with constitutional legitimacy.  After all, it was his 
1980 constitution that set the stage for the very plebiscite, eight years later, which led 
directly to Pinochet’s ouster in the 1989 elections.  Evidence of the military’s particular 
dedication to the constitution came in the run-up to the 1988 vote.  Recognizing his likely 
upcoming defeat (thanks in part to constitutionally mandated access to the media that was 
provided to his opposition), the dictator threatened to cancel the plebiscite.  In response, 
the heads of the other uniformed services (for the President remained in direct control of 
the army) insisted on conformity with the process laid out in the constitution, thus in a 
sense casting the deciding vote on his removal.95  There exists, therefore, sufficient 
reason to believe that in Chile, what the constitution says is of genuine practical concern. 
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, the treatment of the Chilean armed 
forces in the constitution has been fairly dynamic since 1990.  Neither the broad 
statements of the military’s role, nor the political functions handed to senior officers de 
jure have remained what they were as of the transition to democratic rule.  Since 2005, 
the constitution has stated that the armed forces “exist for the defense of la patria and are 
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essential for national security.”96  Innocuous as this assertion may seem by itself, it 
stands in stark contrast to the original text, which until that year included the critical, if 
subtle, additional mandate that the armed forces “guarantee the institutional order of the 
Republic.”97  The constitution thereby orients the military externally first and foremost. 
Importantly, the removal of the reference to “institutional order” also erases any 
legalistic justification for the employment of the army in its traditional (and most 
troublesome, in democratic terms) mission:  “the defense and salvation of the nation’s 
traditions and its permanent values.”98  This does not necessarily mean that such notions 
have likewise been eliminated from the popular imagination.  Indeed, as will be seen 
below, vestiges of this conception of the military’s position in society remain evident in 
several key aspects of Chile’s military roles and missions.  That it is no longer a part of 
the constitution, however, is an encouraging and significant indicator. 
Aside from the broadly external military role described above, the internal 
political responsibilities given to the armed forces have also taken a considerable turn 
over the past twenty years.  Direct political participation by senior and retired military 
officers was pervasive during the authoritarian period, and it remained enshrined in the 
constitution inherited by President Aylwin in 1990.  Clearly, such extensive political 
involvement meant that the armed forces, particularly at the highest levels, were 
politicized beyond what can be considered healthy for the prospects of democratic 
consolidation.  With military officers in powerful positions in all three branches of 
government, security forces were able to act with considerable autonomy.  Moreover, 
having such extensive involvement in the governance of the nation without having to 
answer to any constituency (i.e., the electorate) could only have reinforced the sense 
within the organization that it occupied a place apart from the rest of government, with a 
unique and almost god-given capacity to defend the values and identity of the Chilean 
nation as it saw fit. 
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Official military presence and influence in the government beyond the ministry of 
defense was effectively closed off by the 2005 constitutional reforms.  The Chilean 
constitution therefore now provides a clearly externally orientation for the armed forces.  
Political involvement for military officers has been eliminated almost completely, with 
only the considerably emaciated NSC providing direct contact with the president, and 
only at his or her invitation.  The constitution also no longer contains any legalistic basis 
for military intervention on behalf of “institutional order.”  In short, the fundamental, 
constitutionally mandated role of Chile’s military forces is external, with low political 
involvement. 
2. Defense White Papers 
Having established the constraints placed on the armed forces by the Chilean 
constitution, this paper will now examine another important official expression of roles 
and missions:  the series of defense white papers (Libros de la Defensa Nacional) that 
have been published by the Ministry of Defense since 1997.  The first of these was 
something of a breakthrough for Chile, being the first of its kind in the nation’s history.  
Marcos Robledo notes that before then, the principal aspects of defense policy had never 
been openly published.99  As President Lagos noted in the opening pages of the second 
edition, published in 2002, the objective behind the white papers was (and presumably 
remains) to enable both Chilean citizens and the international community (especially 
neighboring governments) to examine and even question defense policy, “including its 
objectives and orientations, as well as the most effective way to achieve them with the 
public funds allocated to such ends.”100 
Robledo further observes that the white papers “have been widely accepted by the 
armed forces,” and that they represent the culmination of a collective process that 
“incorporated military opinions and visions.”101  A report by the respected Red de 
Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina suggests that the level of cooperation evident in 
 
99 Robledo, "Chilean Civil-Military Relations," 112. 
100 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile, Quinta Parte, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2002, 
available at http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/chi-02-part5.htm (accessed May 04, 2010). 
101 Robledo, "Chilean Civil-Military Relations," 112. 
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the preparation of the white papers has only grown “more profound” with each iteration, 
and that it should serve as an example to other countries.102  It is certainly encouraging to 
note that military officers have taken to heart the policies promulgated by the civilian 
government. 
On the other hand, this last assertion raises some hard questions, especially given 
that the first white paper was formulated and published while Pinochet was still the 
sitting commander-in-chief of the army.  To what extent are the “opinions and visions” of 
uniformed leaders balanced with those of their civilian counterparts?  Does widespread 
acceptance of the white papers among military members really mean anything if the 
documents merely reflect what those personnel already tend to believe?  Consideration 
must also be given to the substantive value of Chile’s white papers.   A skeptical Pion-
Berlin calls these publications, and others like it from neighboring countries, examples of 
“transparent obfuscation.”103  He argues that they do not meet the most critical goals of 
defense policy:  enumerating strategic objectives, defining existing and potential threats 
to national security, and outlining strategies to achieve those objectives and confront 
those threats.  Instead, they “amount to little more than superficial reflections and sterile 
generalizations.”104  Accurate as this critique may be, there is still value in studying these 
books, as they nevertheless represent an expression of the Chilean conception of its 
defense environment (even if only in broad strokes) and of the ways in which the armed 
forces should behave in that context. 
A close look at the proclamations made in the past three editions of the libros de 
defensa reveals that significant vestiges of traditional views of the military’s role and 
identity persist to this day.  Given that these documents are expressions of a shared view 
of the appropriate position of the armed services within national policy, it is noteworthy 
that all three of them preserve some of the more problematic missions and identities that 
have been a part of Chile’s military history, through both good times and bad.  This 
includes even the most recently published (2010) version of the white paper. 
 
102 Navarro, Metodología para el Análisis de los Ministerios de Defensa: El Caso Chile, section 6. 
103 Pion-Berlin, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," 30. 
104 Ibid., 30. 
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This is not to say that there is no evidence of modern, democratic principles in 
these publications.  Indeed, in its principal expression of the mission of the armed forces, 
the white paper, in all three editions, begins by quoting the constitutional purpose 
described above.  In all three versions, the mission is further specified to mean the 
defense of Chile’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the protection of the populace 
against external threats.  No mention is made in any of them of internal threats, 
subversion, or even terrorism.105  Furthermore, since 1997, the paper has consistently 
highlighted the international role of the Chilean military, including peacekeeping 
operations and the creation of “bonds of military cooperation” with neighboring 
countries.106  All of these missions are in keeping with the spirit of the external 
orientation spelled out in the constitution.  They furthermore remain within the bounds of 
what Hunter and Pion-Berlin would consider “safe” missions:  they are outwardly 
oriented, and they hew closely to the constitutionally mandated roles crafted by the 
civilian government. 
The explication of missions does not stop there, however.  In a throwback to 
traditional Chilean military identity, the 2010 version includes in the third paragraph of 
the “Armed Forces” section a reiteration of the oath of service taken by members upon 
entry into the military.  This pledge places the defense of the nation’s “essential values” 
in a central position.107  Older editions of the white paper provide similar references to 
the military’s role in “socioeconomic and cultural development,”108 as well as “the 
cultivation of the country’s historical tradition, and the transmission of the principal traits 
of our national identity.”109 
Such relics of Latin America military thought are even more in evidence in the 
sections devoted specifically to each of the services.  The army’s section provides 
 
105 The omission of terrorism is noteworthy in itself, given that the constitution actually devotes an 
entire article to it (a holdover from the wording formulated by Pinochet himself). 
106 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile, Quinta Parte, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1997, 
available at http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/defc-pV.htm (accessed May 04, 2010). 
107 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile (Santiago: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2010), 242. 
108 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile, Quinta Parte, 1997. 
109 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile, Quinta Parte, 2002. 
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particularly telling examples.  In every version, its service-specific mission is preceded 
by a statement that “the army of Chile was born with and for la patria.”  Unsurprisingly, 
sensitivity to pinochetistas is especially apparent in the 1997 edition, which follows this 
statement with a summary history of the Chilean army.  Somewhat astonishingly, in 
seven full paragraphs of historical narrative, just one sentence is devoted to the bulk of 
the twentieth century, during which time the army evidently merely “continued 
contributing to the maintenance of peace.”110  Such whitewashing is avoided in the two 
later versions, where the historical narrative has been omitted altogether.  One must also 
wonder why a white paper, purportedly devoted to spelling out policy, objectives and 
orientations, should include any but the most cursory references to historical narrative, let 
alone to emotional appeals to the identity of the armed forces. 
The text of the libros de defensa is indicative of a Chilean defense establishment 
that keeps one foot in the present and the other firmly in the past.  The military has 
unquestionably embraced its increasingly external orientation, as provided for in the 
constitution.  At the same time, however, there remain in these official publications 
numerous elements of a mode of identity and self-perception that can at best be 
considered outdated and, at worst, dangerous.  As one study noted about the state of such 
conceptions throughout Latin America, “while the worst features of national security 
doctrine…have been purged from many of the legal documents…it is not true that the 
concept of defense that replaced security has been defined in sufficiently precise and 
limiting terms.”111  Chile appears to be no exception to this assessment.  A look at the 
external missions of its armed forces further illustrates this ambiguous position. 
C. EXTERNAL MISSIONS:  OVERCOMING CHILE’S GEOPOLITICAL 
LEGACY? 
As noted above, most of the externally focused missions assigned to the Chilean 
military are defined explicitly in terms of protecting the nation’s borders, maintaining its 
sovereignty, and defending its territorial integrity.  These missions are not, in and of 
 
110 Specifically, the sentence covers the period 1906–1994.  Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile, 
Quinta Parte, 1997. 
111 Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, "Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers?” 424. 
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themselves, particularly noteworthy.  Nevertheless, in the case of Chile, one must 
consider how defense policy, shaped by the visions of both civilian and uniformed 
personnel, is reflective of a uniquely powerful legacy of geopolitical thought.  Jack Child 
describes how this worldview, in which national power is inextricably tied to national 
territory, has played an influential role in Chilean history, going back at least as far as the 
War of the Pacific.112  One could argue that this strain of thinking actually got its start in 
Chile as early as that war’s predecessor, the War of the Confederation.  It was then that 
Diego Portales, one of Chile’s founding fathers, insisted, “We must dominate forever in 
the Pacific,” a sentiment which retains its power for chilenos even today.113  More 
recently, and perhaps even more significantly, Augusto Pinochet, who considered himself 
a geopolitician, helped to cement the primacy of this expansionist and inherently 
militaristic outlook during his time in power.  Using the dictator’s own treatise, 
Geopolítica, as a text, this philosophy came to dominate teaching in government and 
military academies.114 
1. Geopolitics in Chile 
The relationship between geopolitical thought on the one hand and civil-military 
relations, on the other, is not an obvious one.  As has been noted already, and will be 
emphasized in the coming pages, the Chilean case places a magnifying glass on this 
relationship.  Above all, geopolitics, being a militaristic and conflict-driven view of 
world affairs, provides the armed forces with a mission.  While the detached observer 
might conclude that Chile suffers no threat from any external power, a Chilean 
geopolitician, by definition, takes the very existence of other states on its borders as a 
threat to its territorial integrity.  Geopolitics, in other words, is a sort of self-fulfilling 
 
112 Jack Child, "The Status of South American Geopolitical Thinking," in South America into the 
1990s: Evolving International Relationships in a New Era, ed. G. Pope Atkins (San Francisco: Westview 
Press, 1990), 58–60. 
113 Jay Kinsbruner, Chile: A Historical Interpretation (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 66. 
114 Howard T. Pittman, "From O'Higgins to Pinochet: Applied Geopolitics in Chile," in Geopolitics of 
the Southern Cone and Antarctica, ed. Philip Kelly and Jack Child (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers), 178. 
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prophecy that “provides the rationale for existing continental disputes.”115  The critical 
question, then, is the extent to which this worldview pervades decisions by both civilian 
and uniformed leadership.  If it is extensive and active, then the military will necessarily 
have a power advantage insofar as geopolitically motivated missions offer easy 
justifications for acquisitions and other defense projects.  Further, if civilians accept 
geopolitics at more or less the same level as their military counterparts, one might 
conclude that this is a reflection of a lack of independent thought on the part of the 
civilian leadership. 
Chile’s one-of-a-kind geography, viewed through a geopolitical lens, offers little 
opportunity for expansion or domination along its eastern border, thanks to the Andes.  In 
every other direction, however, one may find the geopolitical aims of the Chilean defense 
establishment hard at work.  In the north, there is the still-simmering conflict (unarmed 
though it might currently be) between Chile and its two neighbors, Peru and Bolivia (the 
also-ran confederation of the War of the Pacific).  To the south, Chile has settled its 
claims with Argentina over the Beagle Channel, but continues to claim contested portions 
of Antarctica.  Westward, the Chilean claim over the Pacific Ocean, as will be seen 
below, is exceptionally large and is also subject to ongoing international contestation.116  
Collectively, these claims make up the expansive concept of the “Tri-Continental Chile,” 
which includes territorial, insular (or maritime), and Antarctic zones.  As it turns out, the 
most succinct and complete official description of this unique conception of the Chilean 
geographical domain resides in the defense white paper, where it enjoys pride of place as 
the first among six lengthy chapters.117 
 
115 Howard T. Pittman, "Harmony or Discord: The Impact of Democratization on Geopolitics and 
Conflict in the Southern Cone," in Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica, ed. Philip Kelly and 
Jack Child (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 32. 
116 "Peru institutes proceedings against Chile with regard to a dispute concerning maritime 
delimitation between the two States," unofficial press release, International Court of Justice (January 16, 
2008).  See also The Observer, "Chile's Claim on Pacific Waters Alarms Britain," November 7, 1993: 23. 
117 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile, 2010. 
 Figure 1.   Chile's maritime claims (Mar Presencial falls within the darker broken line) 
Source:  Libro de Defensa Nacional, 2010, 37. 
The extent to which uniformed leaders have determined Chile’s geostrategic goals 
(and hence the military’s role within that framework) is not easy to establish with any 
real accuracy.  In any event, the evidence points to a shared responsibility between 
civilian and military personnel.  One example may be sufficient to give the reader a sense 
of the mutual devotion to the geopolitical approach.  The vast area claimed by Chile 
under a concept known as Mar Presencial (see Figure 1) was initially, and independently, 
proposed by the commander-in-chief of the navy in 1990.118  It was soon adopted and 
promoted by civilian thinkers,119 and became national law by 1991.120  Twenty years 
later, this expansive and not uncontroversial notion remains an explicit part of Chile’s 
defense policy.  Although the concept of Mar Presencial is not overtly one of unlimited 
                                                 
118 Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, "Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers?” 431. 
119 Francisco Orrego Vicuña, "Toward an Effective Management of High Seas Fisheries and the 
Settlement of the Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea," Ocean Development and International Law 24, no. 
1 (January 1993):  39–40. 
120 Paul Stanton Kibel, "Alone at Sea: Chile's Presencial Ocean Policy," Journal of Environmental 
Law 12, no. 1 (2000):  44. 
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sovereignty, its stated intention of controlling maritime traffic within its boundaries121 
(aside from being almost laughably impractical) is enough to give legal analysts 
pause.122  Given that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 does 
not sanction any such maritime claim, its precise reason for being is somewhat unclear 
unless one considers it as an attempt to establish international legal precedent for Chilean 
dominion over this enormous swath.123 
It bears mentioning here that an extensive modernization and build-up of defense 
equipment, ostensibly spurred by need (thanks to outdated materiel) and opportunity (in 
the form of revenues drawn from record high copper prices), has given the Chilean armed 
forces a decidedly geopolitical appearance in recent years.124 Chile is not alone in this 
trend, nor is it even the biggest spender in the region, but it has emerged as “the most 
modern and best-equipped army in Latin America.”125  The pattern has spurred along the 
latent conflict with Chile’s northern neighbor, leading Peru’s president to insist on adding 
the issue to the agenda of recent meetings of the Organization of American States, and to 
publicly call for an end to “excessive military spending.”  Other observers have used the 
term “arms race” to describe the situation in the region.126  As to the question of who is 
determining the need for these purchases, it is noteworthy that the civilian finance 
ministry has veto power over the purchases made as a part of this build-up, and that the 
commanders-in-chief of the various armed services have, in practice, consistently sought 
the approval of the minister of defense and the president for their acquisitions.127  Thus, 
 
121 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile, 2010, 39–40. 
122 For skeptical legal analyses, see Thomas A. Clingan Jr., "Mar Presencial (The Presential Sea): 
Déjà vu All Over Again?," Ocean Development and international Law 24, no. 1 (January 1993): 93–97; 
and Kibel, "Alone at Sea,” 43–63. 
123 The Mar Presencial claim represents a 500% increase over the claims permitted to Chile under the 
existing UNCLOS framework.  Kibel also points out that Chile followed a similar pattern when it set the 
precedent for the now-accepted notion of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical 
miles to the sea.  (See Kibel, "Alone at Sea: Chile's Presencial Ocean Policy.") 
124 The Economist, "Speak fraternally but carry a stick; South American defence," May 31, 2008. 
125 The Economist, "A force for good, for now," September 27, 2008. 
126 Juan O. Tamayo, "S. America tensions grow as arms sales do," Los Angeles Times, November 15, 
2009. 
127 See Navarro, Metodología para el Análisis de los Ministerios de Defensa: El Caso Chile, section 
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whether intentionally or not, civilian politicians and military officers have conspired to 
create a sticky foreign policy situation through a modernization program that is (quite 
understandably) interpreted in geopolitical terms by those nations potentially most 
threatened by it. 
The influence of the military on the policy of Mar Presencial is plainly evident.  
The rapidity with which it became sanctioned by national law indicates, however, that 
civilian lawmakers required little convincing of its merits, even after Pinochet had 
stepped down from the presidency.  If, in addition, one considers that defense policies are 
as much reflections of military as they are of civilian thought, as well as the ongoing 
modernization of military equipment, then it seems reasonable to conclude that Chilean 
geopolitical thought is still alive and well, and that it is embraced to more or less the 
same extent by those in and out of uniform.   This would come to no surprise to Jack 
Child, who predicted that this worldview would die a slow death in the post-authoritarian 
Southern Cone: 
The legacy of geopolitics will extend beyond [military] regimes because 
of the way geopolitical thinking became popularized in [the 1960s and 
1970s] through the media and educational systems.  Geopolitical thinking 
in the Southern Cone is also closely linked to nationalism, patriotism, and 
deeply felt beliefs about national sovereignty.  These values, although 
strongly stimulated and manipulated by military regimes, also have an 
existence that is independent of military rule.128 
The legacy of geopolitics in Chile is most evident in its defense policies, 
particularly with respect to the Chilean conception of national territory and the recent 
modernization campaign.  Guns and borders, however, do not by themselves constitute a 
military mission.  In the following section, it will be seen that there is considerably less 
suggestion of geopolitical considerations in the actual missions and activities assigned to 
nation’s armed forces. 
 
128 Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors (New York: 
Praeger, 1985), 173. 
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2. Peacekeeping and Regional Cooperation:  The Obverse of the 
Geopolitical Coin 
Given the apparently substantial influence of geopolitics on leadership, both in 
and out of uniform, one might expect Chile to have rather intense conflicts with its 
neighbors.  One might further imagine that the predominance of geopolitical rivalries 
would vault military leaders toward greater prominence in foreign policy, thus eroding 
civilian authority over the armed forces.  A survey of Chile’s relations and involvement 
with its neighbors demonstrates, however, that such local rivalries have mostly softened 
over the past two decades.129  Moreover, this softening can be shown to have resulted at 
least in part from a growing “internationalism” among senior officers and their civilian 
counterparts, an approach that contrasts significantly with the geopolitics that has been so 
influential in the past. 
Externally, Chilean participation in peacekeeping serves two major purposes.  In 
keeping with the policies outlined in the defense white papers, the first of these goals is to 
establish the country’s position as a player (and perhaps a leader) in regional affairs.  
Accordingly, Chile does not send its peacekeepers just anywhere.  The heavy 
concentration of Chile’s peacekeepers in Haiti is testament to this frugality.  Of the 
approximately 500 personnel it has deployed to UN peace operations around the world, 
more than 96 percent are a part of MINUSTAH, with the remaining twenty or so 
individuals spread among the Palestinian territories, Cyprus, and Kashmir.130  The 
combined Argentine-Chilean peacekeeping force is another example of the application of 
this mission set to the broader foreign policy goal of regional integration.  Having so far  
 
 
129 For two such studies, see Kristina Mani, Democratization and Rivalry: Lessons from the 
Resolution of Rivalries in South America, Paper presented at annual meeting, International Studies 
Association (Honolulu: ISA, March 2005); and Randall R. Parish Jr., “Democrats, Dictators, and 
Cooperation: the Transformation of Argentine-Chilean Relations,” Latin American Politics and Society 48, 
no. 1 (Spring 2006): 143–174. 
130 UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, April 30, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/apr10_3.pdf. 
 51
                                                
achieved only symbolic results,131 it seems especially clear that this move was aimed 
above all at détente between the neighbors more than any concrete peacekeeping 
objectives. 
A secondary goal of Chilean peacekeeping is to assure the continued supply of 
U.S. military assistance.  Such funding comprises the greater portion of the aid the nation 
receives from the United States, which itself is justified (in somewhat circular fashion) as 
a means to improve Chile’s peacekeeping capacity.132  Fundamentally related to this goal 
is a larger foreign policy objective of maintaining strong ties with the United States in a 
broader sense.  In this context, one can clearly see Chile’s leading role in the 
establishment of MINUSTAH during its stint on the Security Council as an effort to 
appease its erstwhile partner after having opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.133 
Domestically, the reasons for deploying the armed forces for peacekeeping 
missions are well understood.  Such missions are attractive to both civilians and military 
officers, though for different reasons.  To civilians, peacekeeping pays off not just in 
terms of foreign policy (as described above), but also as a motivation for improved civil-
military relations.  For uniformed leadership, peacekeeping is a guarantor or institutional 
relevancy and survival in an environment otherwise lacking in employment and funding 
opportunities.  Peace operations also provide a source of professional experience, not to 
mention substantial augments to participants’ salaries.134 
Given these diverse benefits, the puzzle of Chilean peacekeeping lies not in 
understanding why it happened, but rather in why it only happened so recently.  
 
131 See BBC Monitoring Latin America – Political, "Argentine, Chilean defence ministers head joint 
peace force ceremony," April 09, 2008.  Two years after its founding, the official Chilean peacekeeping 
force website lists only “future activities” for the combined task force, dubbed Cruz del Sur.  (See 
http://www.cecopac.cl/chile_en_opaz/cruz_del_sur.htm.) 
132 Peter J. Meyer, Chile: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, Report for Congress 
no. R40126, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: CRS, March 2, 2010), 14. 
133 Mônica Hirst, South American Intervention in Haiti, Comment paper, Fundación para las 
Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (Madrid: FRIDE, April 2007), 5. 
134 Antonio L. Palá, "Peacekeeping and Its Effects on Civili-Military Relations: The Argentine 
Experience," in International Security and Democracy: Latin American and the Caribbean in the Post-
Cold War Era, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 131; and Hunter, 
State and Soldier, 5. 
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Participation in Haiti in 2004 marked the first-ever major deployment of troops for this 
mission set.135  Before then, scattered detachments of observers, usually numbering in 
the single digits, were the rule for Chile.  This historical trend, which stood in contrast to 
other born-again democracies in the region, such as Brazil and Argentina, was generally 
perceived to reflect a desire on the part of an autonomous military to retain a measure of 
national independence in its operations.136  If this was indeed the case, then it stands to 
reason that the shift in Chile’s commitment to peacekeeping is likewise reflective of a 
shift in attitudes among both military and civilian officials since that time.  Recognizing 
this change, a number of scholars have pointed to a growing internationalist approach as 
the cause.137  Mônica Hirst, among others, asserts that Chile, like its Southern Cone 
peers, has “become more flexible regarding [its] anti-interventionist beliefs, accepting 
expanded political roles in Latin American affairs.”138  What sets Chile apart from its 
neighbors, then, is only that this shift came later.  This delay makes sense when one 
considers that both Brazil and Argentina made the transition from military to civilian rule 
before Chile. 
The emerging internationalism evident in Chile’s peacekeeping missions, 
including the combined task force and the shared leadership of MINUSTAH with Brazil, 
seems to diverge significantly from the geopolitical tendencies that are so apparent 
elsewhere in Chilean defense policy.  It is certainly not impossible for the two attitudes to 
coexist—there is, after all, little precedent for genuine philosophical consistency in the 
pragmatic world of international relations – but there is an obvious tension between them.  
The disconnect between Chile’s defense and diplomatic structures, pointed out by Arturo 
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Sotomayor, presents an ongoing barrier to the reconciliation of these two trends.139  For 
now, the military’s geopolitical and realist aims are likely to remain the dominant 
motivation in determining peacekeeping participation. 
Which one of them will come to dominate Chile’s foreign policy, as well as the 
definitions of the military’s external roles and missions, is an open question.  If actions 
count for more than words, however, it seems apparent that geopolitics is ebbing as an 
influential worldview in Chile. 
More than one author has argued that the evolutionary arrow in this case points 
toward internationalism.  Parish and Mani describe a top-down process in which the 
civilian executive has driven the armed forces to gradually turn away from geopolitical 
realism toward a more integrationalist approach.  Ulrich, for her part, differs from these 
two authors in that she believes that the same process has been brought about not by 
civilian or executive leadership, but instead by senior military officers.140  To a certain 
degree, the distinction is irrelevant to the larger question of the future of Chilean foreign 
policy and civil-military relations.  Under either construct, there appears to be consensus 
that both civilians and uniformed personnel are beginning to lift one foot out of the past 
and stepping toward a more modern, internationalist approach.  Shared as it seems to be, 
the emerging pattern of Chilean internationalism is bound to lead to even greater 
cooperation between military and civilian leaders in the future, thus contributing to 
strengthened civil-military relations. 
D. INTERNAL ROLES AND MISSIONS 
The generally outward role of the Chilean military that has been described above 
does not mean that it has no part to play in internal operations.  Quite to the contrary, the 
armed forces have substantial responsibilities with respect to activities within their own 
borders.  Even the constitution, as shall be demonstrated, provides for an implicit internal 
 
139 Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, "Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While 
Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to 
Peacekeeping Operations," Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010):  194. 
140 Ulrich argues that the lack of civilian control and expertise necessarily means that uniformed 
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orientation to a certain degree.  By all appearances, Chile’s experience in the aftermath of 
the devastating recent earthquake proved that the armed forces have finally been 
subordinated to the point where this internal orientation can be safely carried out.  
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that, in spite of these superficial indicators of 
success, the internal role assigned to Chile’s military still carry some inherent risks for 
the continued consolidation of civilian control. 
1. Regimes of Exception:  Risky Business 
The essentially outward-looking nature of the military role enshrined in the 
constitution is not without its inconsistencies.  Chief among these are the various regimes 
of exception that Chile, like so many other Latin American states, retains within its 
fundamental legal charter.  Even after the major package of constitutional reforms passed 
in 2005, there are no less than four different states of exception at the president’s disposal 
in the event of some sort of disturbance.  Table 1 summarizes the differences among 
them.  Of particular note for this study are the two states, “of catastrophe” and “of 
emergency,” that place affected zones under the “dependency” (a term that is not defined 
in the constitution) of the Ministry of Defense. 
Table 1.   Constitutional states of exception in Chile 
 Article Reason MoD 
Dependency 














within 5 days* 
None 






within 5 days* 
15 
days** 






For extension only; 
must notify of 
measures taken 
1 year** 
Emergency 42 Grave breach of 
public order or 
grave damage to 




For extension only; 




Notes: * - Up or down vote only (no modifications allowed).  Consent assumed if no vote taken after 5 days. 
 ** - President may extend indefinitely with congressional approval. 
 *** - President may extend in 15-day increments only, and only with congressional approval. 
Source:  Constitución Política de la República de Chile de 1980, 22 September 2005. 
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a. The 2010 Earthquake:  Reason for Hope? 
For the first time since the transition twenty years earlier, the states of 
exception were put to the test after the major earthquake and tidal wave that struck south-
central Chile in February of 2010.  After hesitating for three full days, President Michelle 
Bachelet declared a state of catastrophe in six of the country’s fifteen zones.  The delay, 
though partly a result of the slow development of social unrest that unfolded after the 
quake, was mostly due to debate among Bachelet’s inner circle regarding the symbolism 
of the move.141  Following the president’s announcement of the move, the Minister of 
Defense placed a general officer in charge of each zone, declared his intention to work in 
partnership with the Ministry of the Interior, and publicly reiterated that the military 
would remain subordinate to civilian authority.142  Only three days later, the New York 
Times reported that civilians in the city of Concepción, quite understandably more 
concerned with their own safety than with the historical legacy of repression at the hands 
of Pinochet’s armed forces, were embracing the security forces and praising their 
successful efforts.  Rather than inciting fear or reigniting bad memories, it seemed that 
the direct contact and positive impression provided by the state of exception had had the 
reverse effect.  “The military’s relationship with the country’s people was turning a new 
page,” according to the Times.143  Even Gregory Weeks, historically skeptical of Chile’s 
civil-military relations,144 declared within two weeks that the triumph of the soldiers who 
brought aid and security to the disaster-stricken regions of the nation “marked a return to 
a normal civil-military relationship.”145  The state of catastrophe and its attendant 
restrictions on civil life (which had included a curfew and limitations on movement) were 
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lifted before a month had passed.146  Truly, it seems this devastating event provided an 
opportunity to demonstrate just how far Chile had come in cementing an appropriate role 
for its armed forces. 
At the risk of excessive skepticism, however, it must be borne in mind that 
the opportunity for abuse still exists within this system.  The fact that the military made 
such a positive impression during the most recent state of catastrophe does not mean that 
all is well.147  However much good might appear to have come out of this particular case, 
any constitutionally defined regime of exception that hands direct control over segments 
of the country to the military, even at the behest of a civilian executive, is dangerous.  
Unquestionably, the armed forces by virtue of their size, readiness, and training, are often 
the quickest and most effective means of responding to domestic crises, such as a natural 
disaster.148  That this response requires a uniformed officer to be placed in charge of the 
affected area, answerable only to the executive, is not quite so evident.  Furthermore, the 
implication is probably not lost on military personnel that they alone possess some 
special quality of leadership and character to which the nation must turn for protection in 
times of dire need.  It is just this sort of unique identity, distinct among their countrymen, 
to which Brian Loveman points in describing the “warrior-priest tradition” in Latin 
American militaries.149  Military involvement in crisis response efforts tends to foster 
this image among the public at large, as well.150  And it is in this vein that military 
leaders have “found a fixed moral rationale” for taking political matters into their own
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2. Other Internal Missions 
Chile’s armed forces are involved in other domestic operations, as well.  So-called 
“civic action” programs have been undertaken by all three branches, focused mostly on 
the least developed areas of the country, in the far north and south.  Such activities 
include road construction, emergency transportation, cartographic services, and the 
regulation of civil aviation and the merchant marine.152  The army has also played an 
extensive role in the provision of medical services in area where the government is 
otherwise unable to do so.153  Finally, the constitution includes one other domestic 
mission for the armed forces:  the maintenance, alongside the carabineros, or federal 
police, of public order during elections.154 
It is worth mentioning that there are encouraging signs that the military is not the 
default government response mechanism in the face of internal difficulties.  Unrest 
among the indigenous Mapuche in the southern parts of Chile has been an ongoing 
problem for the government in recent years.  These protest activities have taken on an 
increasingly violent tone, with riots sometimes escalating into “battles” with police 
forces, and occasional shootings and acts of arson and sabotage.155  One Mapuche 
organization even declared war on the country late in 2009.156  Given the heated nature 
of this conflict, it would not be surprising to hear calls for troops to respond.  After all, 
deploying the army to put down uncooperative indigenous populations is hardly without 
precedent in Chile.157  Yet the army has played no evident role in quelling the unrest, 
with the response by authorities in Santiago consistently limited to law enforcement and 
social programs.158  It is thus heartening to note that the only uniformed personnel 
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involved in this effort have been police officers.  However harsh the official answer to the 
Mapuche crisis might be judged, responsibility for it cannot be placed in the laps of the 
armed forces.  In fact, the civilian government had put in place a structure for handling 
such internal threats as early as President Frei’s administration in the mid-1990s,159 
signaling that politicians worked fairly rapidly to avoid having to deploy the armed forces 
to deal with domestic anti-government and terrorist movements. 
3. Summary:  The Impact of the Internal Missions 
Wendy Hunter points out three key was that civic action missions, though 
obviously beneficial in the immediate sense, undermine the subordination of the military 
to civilian control and potentially harm the government in the long term.  First, along 
with peacekeeping operations (discussed above), civic action offers a raison d’être to a 
defense establishment that lacks any genuine threat against which to orient itself, thus 
allowing it to compete (perhaps unfairly) for scarce budgetary resources.  Second, like 
the regimes of exception, civic action missions feed into the antiquated self-perception 
among officers (and civilians, for that matter) that uniformed personnel are inherently 
better suited to the task of lifting their compatriots out of difficult circumstances.  Finally, 
by deploying the armed forces to carry out development programs (as opposed to crisis 
response missions) within its borders, the government inhibits the growth of civilian 
institutions needed to implement sustained social programs.160 
Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas maintain that internal roles are no more threatening to 
democratic control than external roles.  So long as civilians are the ones who determine 
the timing, location, and nature of domestic military missions, these operations are not 
inherently likely to lead to political intervention by the armed forces.161  This conclusion 
provides an important caveat to Hunter’s analysis, but it does not controvert the thrust of 
her argument.  What this means for Chile, in other words, is that the internal missions 
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carried out under civic action programs and regimes of exception are unlikely to lead to 
another military-led coup, but that they nevertheless make difficult the further 
consolidation of democratic rule. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Having celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the transition to democracy only 
months ago, Chile can legitimately claim to have made considerable progress in 
eliminating the barriers to civilian control that were left in place by the Pinochet regime.  
In spite of this progress, an examination of the roles and missions that are assigned to the 
armed forces demonstrates that there is work yet to be done.  Civil-military relations in 
Chile are strong, and there is scant evidence that backsliding could occur.  Still, Chilean 
leaders have not left the past behind them when it comes to defense policy. 
The constitution provides a suitably external overall role for the military, and yet 
also includes provisions under which military officers can be placed in control of entire 
zones of the country, answerable only to the executive.  The libros de defensa published 
by the Ministry of Defense expand on the external role enshrined in the constitution, 
outlining a robust involvement in regional cooperative activities.  However, those same 
defense white papers retain a number of vestiges of traditional and dangerous modes of 
military identity.   
The external missions undertaken by the Chilean military, particularly in 
peacekeeping operations, illustrate a growing internationalist attitude among leaders in 
the defense establishment.  This approach appears to be gradually supplanting the 
powerful legacy of geopolitical thought that has for so long influenced Chile’s foreign 
relations.  Nonetheless, that legacy is still very much in evidence within the pages of the 
defense white papers, as well as in the reactions of Chile’s neighbors to the ongoing 
round of military modernization. 
Within its own borders, Chile makes wide-ranging use of the different branches of 
the armed services.  While it is perfectly reasonable that they be called upon to respond in 
times of crisis, the level of authority that accompanies that response, as well as the 
permanence of these sorts of missions, may harm the continued development of 
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institutions of governance under civilian auspices.  Furthermore, the many domestic 
missions placed in military hands risk fortifying the same outdated self-perception that is 
evident in the libros de defensa.  The likelihood of a return to anything like the 1973 coup 
is negligible, but work remains in order to remove the vestiges of military identity and to 
allow for the flowering of civilian-led social programs in the least developed portions of 
the country. 
The picture of a defense establishment with one foot still in the past seems to hold 
true after a look at the missions carried out by the Chilean military.  Returning to the 
operative definition of effective civil-military relations, it can be safely said that the 
balance of power in defense decision-making, by and large, lies with the civilian 
leadership.  The extent to which the military’s role is oriented externally is less 
encouraging.  Political participation by officers is a thing of the past, but the use of the 
armed forces for internal development has a net negative impact on the nation.  The 
regimes of exception are particularly troubling in this regard.  For better or for worse, 
though, those mission and other defense policies suggest that both civilian politicians and 
military officers share an outdated notion of the military’s identity, and that geopolitics 
continues to hold some sway in both camps.  The good news is that things continue to 
change. 
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IV. SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSION 
The previous two chapters examined in some detail both the affirmative and the 
negative sides of civil-military relations in Chile.  Having done so, it is now possible to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of this critical measure of democratic consolidation.  
This summary chapter will demonstrate that civilian control of the military in Chile is 
effective, but that considerable vestiges of military autonomy remain in place, even after 
twenty years.  Recalling Pion-Berlin’s argument that civil-military relations exist along a 
continuum of definitions, and post-authoritarian Latin American states are unlikely to 
meet the high standards often applied by means of normative definitions of civilian 
control, it will be seen below that Chile has unquestionably achieved political 
management of its armed forces. 
In the two decades since elected civilians took office and ended the military 
authoritarian dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, Chile has undoubtedly come a long way 
toward effectively subordinating the previously dominant armed forces.  The “limitations, 
obstacles, and restraints,” which President Aylwin acknowledged so early in his term, 
have been mostly overcome.  In spite of the genuinely positive aspects of Chilean civil-
military relations that were so prominently on display in the days and weeks after the 
February 2010 earthquake, there remain a number of fundamental vestiges of military 
autonomy that demand attention in order to fully consolidate civilian control of the armed 
forces.  Three key areas—the Copper Law, regimes of exception, and traditional military 
identity—have seen no change at all to military enclaves.  In others, progress has only 
been achieved through informal and pragmatic workarounds, leaving difficult legislative 
questions unanswered.  The constitutional role of the military has been appropriately 
redefined, limiting it to a primarily external orientation and removing any undue political 
involvement.  Nevertheless, extensive internal missions are still a part of the everyday 
business of the armed forces.  Even the same constitution provides for circumstances in 
which uniformed personnel can take charge of entire zones of the country.  Elsewhere, 
vestiges of the traditional Latin American mode of identity assigned to the military as  
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guardians of national character and social values are readily apparent.  This chapter seeks 
to understand why so much variation exists in the progress achieved in each of the areas 
considered in the preceding chapters. 
In sum, it is reasonable to say that civilian leaders in Chile have subordinated the 
armed forces to a great extent.  Political management exists and is in all likelihood 
irreversible.  Nevertheless, the overall picture of civil-military relations presents a mixed 
level of progress, with great success in some areas, and little to no success in others.  
However much the modes-of-transition literature may have helped to understand the state 
of affairs in the first decade or so after the transition to democracy, the electoral dynamics 
framework is the one that can best explain these varying levels of achievement.  A key 
finding of this study is that, while the rational choice approach implicit in electoral 
dynamics certainly helps explain why some prerogatives have been completely overcome 
in Chile, this same theoretical framework also explains those areas in which little or no 
progress at all has come about.  In other words, electoral dynamics, in and of itself, is by 
no means a guarantee that civilian control of the military will be fully consolidated.  
Implicit in this framework is the requirement that sufficient incentives exist to convince 
politicians to support policies that will increase their power with respect to the armed 
forces.  There is no way to predict if or when such incentives will come into being, let 
alone to ensure that they do so. 
Another key finding is that not all measures of civil-military relations can be 
affected by electoral dynamics.  Widely held perceptions of military identity and the 
ways in which people, whether in or out of uniform, view the threats and opportunities 
presented by the world situation, for example, cannot be legislated or mandated.  This 
does not mean that the modes of transition will necessarily doom these sorts of issues to 
stagnation.  Instead, there is a natural tendency for these conditions to change over time 
as a result of myriad factors, most of which elude prediction. 
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A. PROGRESS AND STAGNATION:  A PICTURE OF CHILEAN CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS 
As a means of synopsis, this chapter will begin by presenting its findings within 
the framework of “jurisdictional boundaries” conceived by Trinkunas.  This method 
provides a succinct visual representation of the evolution in the state of civilian authority 
over the armed forces.  It measures the level of military participation in four categories of 
state policy:  external defense, internal security, public policy, and state leadership 
selection.  Military participation in each category is coded as one of three possible levels:  
military dominant, shared authority, and civilian dominant.   As higher levels of military 
participation are found in each of the four categories, the likelihood of successful 
consolidation of democracy decreases.  Shared authority in state leadership selection, for 
example, is more threatening to democratization than is military dominance in external 
defense.  Effective civilian control, in turn, is defined in this framework as civilian 
dominance in all categories except external security, which may be coded as either 
civilian dominant or shared authority.162 
As the preceding chapters made clear, civilian control was weak—and the 
prospects for improvement were dim—when Pinochet left office in 1990.  Trinkunas 
classifies Chile’s outlook for democratic consolidation under these circumstances as 
“regime persistence,” a sort of status quo in which the government has sufficient 
competence and capacity to keep itself in power, but at the same time has insufficient 
leverage over the military to make any real change in the relationship or jurisdictional 
boundaries between the two.  Just as Pinochet intended, politicians in Santiago at the time 
had a “narrow opportunity structure” that severely limited their ability to change the 
conditions that they had inherited from the dictatorship. 
More specifically, at the time of the transition there was clear military dominance 
in both internal security and external defense.  The latter had enjoyed almost complete 
independence from civilian influence for most of Pinochet’s dictatorship, and even the 
installation of a Concertación politician at the helm of the Ministry of Defense made little 
 
162 Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control,” 174–177. 
impact, given the institutional weakness of that organization at the time.  Internally, the 
constitution explicitly mandated that the armed forces ensure the institutional order of the 
republic, opening the way for any number of expansive definitions of this term.  The 
multiple enclaves of direct and indirect political influence that remained in place 
contributed to a strong military voice in external defense, internal security, and public 
policy.  Of course, this last area also now enjoyed much more influence from elected 
leaders than it had before 1990, meaning that there was shared authority in this realm.  As 
for the selection of national leadership, this must be coded as civilian dominant, since the 
impact of the military on this process was at most tangential by this time.  The resulting 
graph of this situation can be seen in Figure 2.  The predominance of darker shading, 
creeping outward from the center, offers an apt depiction of the reach of the military 
power at the time.  To be sure, it had been contained since the earlier regime, when every 
ring, with the arguable exception of public policy, would have been shaded dark gray, but 
that containment only went so far, and the leaders chosen by the people had to concede 
substantial amounts of power to their unelected military counterparts. 
 
Figure 2.   Jurisdictional boundaries in Chile since the transition to democracy 
Source:  Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control,” 175-176.  2010 measures based on author’s assessment. 
Since then, as has been discussed extensively above, things have improved.  
Figure 2 also illustrates the current state of jurisdictional boundaries in Chile.  
Unfortunately, this condition, too, falls short of a full realization of effective civil-
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military relations, or what Trinkunas terms “strong institutionalized control.”163  In 
particular, the continued presence of influence from uniformed officers in so many 
realms of internal security (broadly defined as this term is in Chile) prevents this country 
from surpassing the strictest standards of civilian control.  Nevertheless, What can be 
argued in the case of Chile is that it has achieved political management, to the extent that 
“in a legal and practical sense” the armed forces remain subservient to the command of 
their elected and appointed civilian masters.164  Whatever might be said about vestiges of 
military autonomy (and plenty will be said below), there is no evidence that uniformed 
officers have any desire, intention, or ability (in terms of political support) to disobey the 
policy decisions handed down by the government, let alone to actively intervene in 
matters of state governance. 
B. VARIATIONS IN PROGRESS:  SOME STICKY CONDITIONS 
The purpose here is not to present an overall negative picture of Chilean civil-
military relations.  In fact, military subordination to civilian democratic authority is, on 
balance, strong in Chile.  Credit for this significant turnaround from the overwhelmingly 
negative situation inherited by the Aylwin administration in 1990 goes primarily to the 
various rounds of constitutional reforms that have gradually chipped away at the barriers 
to progress over the years.  To be sure, 2005 represented a milestone in this effort, but it 
did not mark the only changes that were made, either to the constitution, or to other 
factors affecting civilian control. 
So where has progress been made, and where have things stagnated?  Table 2 
illustrates the variation in the overall findings of this study by coding each of the issues 
analyzed as having achieved “significant progress,” “some progress or workaround,” or 
“little or no progress.”  The first of these categorizations is meant to indicate that a given 
issue has been changed (both formally and in practice) such that it either ceases to inhibit 
effective civilian control, or actively promotes military subordination.  The second 
category, “some progress or workaround,” is applied to those factors that have achieved 
 
163 Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control,” 176. 
164 Pion-Berlin, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," 26. 
 66
some apparent measure of improvement in the direction of “significant progress,” but 
without formal legal reforms and/or without complete implementation of the reform in 
question.  The final and most negative categorization, “no progress,” includes those 
aspects discussed in this paper that have not undergone any significant modification in 
the past twenty years.  Three of the issues considered fall somewhere in between the 
second and third columns, indicating that improvement is evident, but that the available 
evidence indicates a nascent change that has yet to become overwhelmingly apparent or 
formally institutionalized.  Notwithstanding the fairly broad nature of this scheme of 
categorization, and the subjectivity inherent in the author’s final assessment of these 
measures, this exercise is useful in order to determine some equally broad patterns of 
variation in the improvements (and lack thereof) in Chilean civil-military relations. 
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Source:  Author’s assessment. 
To aid in finding these patterns, Table 2 dispenses with the dichotomy between 
“barriers to progress” and “roles and missions” that has been employed up to this point in 
this study.  Instead, three classes of factors are grouped together:  constitutional reforms, 
other legal reforms, and extra-legal reforms.  Clearly, the first of these involves any 
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changes made to the constitution with respect to the armed forces since 1990.  “Other 
legal reforms” comprises changes to any other laws, such as the Organic Law of the 
Armed Forces, that have impacted civilian control of the military.  The third and final 
class, “extra-legal factors,” includes those conditions that cannot necessarily be legislated 
or mandated.  This characterization is fitting for such issues as geopolitics, modes of 
identity, and military contestation, all of which are at least as important as any of the 
formally mandated conditions found in the other two groupings above. 
Broadly speaking, Table 2 demonstrates that Chilean politicians have had greatest 
success in modifying the constitution, and the least success in changing or creating other 
legal instruments.  The extra-legal factors, which politicians have only a limited ability to 
directly impact, demonstrate mixed levels of progress, with a trend toward improvement.  
The table also illustrates the three most troublesome conditions that continue to restrain 
civilian control of the military in Chile:  the regimes of exception, the Copper Law, and 
vestiges of traditional military identity. 
1. Constitutional Reforms 
That the most advances have been seen among constitutional reforms may not be 
as surprising as the negative predictions made by modes-of-transition scholars would 
have led us to expect.  One of those same authors, in fact, recognized the progress being 
made in this regard soon after the transition.  Mark Ensalaco pointed out in 1994 that “the 
splendid irony of Chile’s continuing transition is that democratic forces are succeeding in 
transforming the political system they took over from the military by tampering with the 
military regime’s own Constitution.”165  In contrast, Agüero contends that the reforms 
passed in 1989 represented a merely superficial level of change, one that the outgoing 
military regime was satisfied to permit since it left in place the most crucial elements of 
the constitution that created the institutionalized regime.166  This assessment certainly 
helps to explain the success that the opposition Concertación had in obtaining whatever 
 
165 Ensalaco, "In with the New, Out with the Old?" 409. 
166 Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South 
America," 389. 
 68
                                                
concessions they could prior to the 1990 transition.  Its skeptical outlook, however, fails 
to acknowledge that those same concessions paved the way for future reforms, which, as 
it turned out, came gradually and incrementally until the 2005 package of amendments 
was approved.  The very fact of constitutional reforms having been passed prior to the 
1990 transition means that the Pinochet regime failed to institutionalize itself fully, 
thereby leaving vulnerabilities that could be attacked by democratic politicians.  The 
“irreversible” nature of those reforms, in turn, ensured that future amendments were 
likely only to build upon and strengthen those that came before them.167  The trend 
toward democratic consolidation by means of a gradual, piecemeal overhaul of the 
constitution was established, therefore, before Aylwin even took office. 
2. Other Legal Reforms 
If constitutional amendments have been so important and so successful for 
civilian politicians, why have the other legal reforms needed to consolidate military 
subordination remained so elusive?  The answer to this puzzle lies in the nature of these 
other reforms.  Elected leaders viewed the changes to the constitution as necessary in part 
because they directly impacted the power relationship between themselves and not just 
their opponents in the military and the far-right political parties.  By modifying these 
elements of the chief legal document in Chile, politicians sought, above all else, to 
improve their own position with respect to their opposition.  In keeping with the rational-
choice model identified by Hunter and Fuentes, these individuals were behaving just as 
any other democratically elected leader would, with the primary objective being to keep 
oneself in power for as long as possible.  By and large, the Organic Law of the Armed 
Forces, the secret Copper Law, and questions of amnesty for human rights violations, did 
not threaten Concertación members with being booted from office.  If anything, 
politicians from the other side of the aisle were in a weaker position with respect to these 
laws.  To see this more clearly, each of these issues bears examination separately. 
In the case of the human rights issue, the democratic government played a 
balancing game in which it sought to give the appearance of progress on the issue while 
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at the same time placating the military and the far right in order to win support and 
concessions elsewhere.  Of equal importance in the human rights cases was the simple 
fact that its resolution lay largely beyond the reach of the executive or legislative 
branches.  Instead, the high courts that Pinochet himself had so cleverly packed with his 
supporters, had a stranglehold on the matter.  The problem was even more deeply seated 
than this fact implies, given that even after Aylwin had managed to replace more than a 
third of the High Court judges, the executive found only continued resistance to 
reconciliation efforts.168  This situation would not begin to change until 1997, when 
constitutional reforms that “effectively brought the Pinochet-dominated court era to a 
close” were signed into law.169  Importantly, this legislation also marked a turn for the 
conservative parties that had traditionally been linked so closely to Pinochet, the military, 
and the judiciary.  Pion-Berlin argues that this shift was part of a broader movement 
within the parties of the right to distance themselves from the legacy of Pinochet, an 
implicit recognition of the low level of public support enjoyed by the former dictator and 
those who had tortured and disappeared on his command.170  Garretón pointed up the 
same popular disapproval of political or legalistic justifications for human rights 
violations in 1999.  “The real problem is the reconciliation between the armed forces and 
the minority on the political right, on the one side, and the broader society on the 
other.”171  Thus, electoral dynamics had an impact on the right-wing parties in much the 
same way it affected the ruling left-wing coalition. 
The Organic Law of the Armed Forces has remained essentially untouched to 
date.  Again, rational choice offers an easy explanation for this situation.  The two facets 
of the organic law that most undermine effective civilian control of the military do not 
significantly threaten the ability of politicians to remain in office.  The formal assignment 
of responsibility for doctrine and education to uniformed officers is fitting for a country 
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that has achieved effective political management of its armed forces.  Sufficient numbers 
of civilians with the requisite professional experience to carry out these responsibilities 
simply do not exist.172  On the other hand, military personnel, whether on active duty or 
retired, are readily available to do these sorts of jobs.173  Even the recent modernization 
of the Ministry of Defense fails to address this shortcoming.  The stipulation that the 
defense budget not fall below the floor established by the 1989 budget, as discussed in 
Chapter II, has never proven to be an obstacle to legislators or the president.  The Organic 
Law, therefore, does not present politicians with any incentive for change. 
The Copper Law presents an interesting counterpoint to the case of the Organic 
Law.  In light of the obviously high level of military autonomy guaranteed by this 
particular legislation, one might expect there to be fairly significant motivation for 
politicians to seek its repeal.  Then again, it must also be considered that this law predates 
the Pinochet era, having been passed originally in 1958, and has survived governments 
from across the political spectrum.  Not even the socialist Salvador Allende felt 
compelled to tamper with it.  As was mentioned earlier, Pinochet’s tinkering with the 
Copper Law turned out very quickly to be irrelevant. 
Recent events have shed needed light on this apparent puzzle.  After more than 
half a century of longevity, politicians from both sides of the aisle and at the highest 
levels are publicly and adamantly calling for its repeal.  The timing of these stepped-up 
calls, which go far beyond any rhetorical denouncements of the Copper Law made before 
them, is a direct result of recent historical spikes in world copper prices.  Put simply, the 
Copper Law was not enough of a problem for politicians until the amount of money 
involved became overwhelmingly large.  Sufficient incentive for change, then, has been 
facilitated and pushed along only by recent copper price surges. 
For most of the past two decades, the political will needed to tackle this 
outstanding prerogative once and for all did not materialize.  This makes sense, given that 
copper prices remained low until fairly recently.  So long as commodity prices stayed 
 
172 Navarro, Metodología para el Análisis de los Ministerios de Defensa: El Caso Chile, section 4. 
173 Ibid., section 4. 
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low, there was little reason for anyone to be particularly concerned that the military was 
receiving a portion of the relatively meager revenues from copper exports.  Furthermore, 
and in keeping with the theme of political management, the lack of defense expertise 
among Chilean legislators and their staff has created inertia and a hands-off approach 
with respect to the Copper Law.174  The massive and unprecedented jump in copper 
prices that occurred between 2004 and 2006, however, brought the troubling nature of 
this law into stark relief.  Increasingly strong calls by former President Bachelet and her 
successor, Piñera, including the submission in September of 2009 of a bill that would 
repeal the 10 percent reserve funding, appear to have this law’s days numbered.  The 
reason behind these calls is, once again, the rational decisions by civilian leaders to 
appease constituents.  On the one hand, the government-owned copper industry (known 
as CODELCO) is, for obvious reasons, not fond of handing over one-tenth of its revenues 
to another organization.  Moreover, this same financial obligation does not improve 
CODELCO’s corporate reputation.  Military leaders, on the other hand, are worried about 
the viability of a system that allocates funding based on fluctuating commodities prices, 
and which provides that budget on a rolling two-year timeframe, thus inhibiting effective 
long-range budget planning and projections.175  It seems likely that there is also a 
growing public perception that the Copper Law creates an obvious imbalance in the 
apportionment of state resources.  Notwithstanding their desire for a powerful and 
modern military, Chileans might question why the government should hand over so much 
of its wealth to the apparently healthy armed forces when so many of the country’s 
citizens live below the poverty line, particularly in the absence of genuine external threats 
to security.  Ever since copper prices skyrocketed just a few years ago, then, the 
difficulties inherent in the Copper Law have become evident to all sides, creating a 
consensus that the mandate needs reform. 
 
174 David Álvarez Veloso, "El Sector Defensa en Chile y los Desafíos de una Política Pública," in 
Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina, ed. Marcela Donadio and María de la Paz Tibiletti, 
158–163 (Buenos Aires: Red de Seguridad Defensa de América Latina, 2005). 
175 Steve Anderson, "Chile’s Bachelet Seeks To Overhaul Defense Ministry, Arms Financing," 
Santiago Times, February 8, 2010. 
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Whether that consensus is sufficient to create the political momentum needed to 
formally overturn this legislation remains to be seen.  Opposition to the reform is still 
present, and generally reflects the same geopolitical tendencies that have described 
elsewhere in this study.  Writing last year in Chile’s El Mercurio, the then ex-Minister of 
Defense (who has since returned to that post), Jaime Ravinet expressed concerns that 
without the Copper Law, the military will not receive sufficient funding to confront to 
threats facing the nation.176  He also credits the same law with having permitted the 
country to enjoy “peace and security for more than half a century.”177  Another right-
wing politician worried that a repeal of the Copper Law “sends the wrong signal” in view 
of the continued territorial demands being made by Peru and Bolivia.178  In the eyes of 
some, then, the Copper Law is an essential guarantee against the geopolitical intentions 
of Chile’s neighbors. 
Overhauling the Ministry of Defense is coded in Table 2 as having achieved only 
“some progress.”  The recent passage of the new Organic Law of the Ministry of Defense 
signals that there is a desire on the part of civilian decision-makers to increase their 
control over the armed forces.  For a number of reasons, however, this move fails to 
indicate that significant progress has been made in this regard.  First, the difficulty with 
which the law was passed, requiring more than five years and spanning two presidential 
administrations, indicates that there was minimal consensus among lawmakers on the 
matter of Defense Ministry modernization.  Second, as mentioned above, the law fails to 
address the more troubling aspects of the Organic Law of the Armed Forces, thereby 
leaving in place some of the more critical weaknesses of the minister.  Finally, having 
been implemented only a few months prior to the writing of this study, it would be 
premature to give very much credit to the measure.  Time will tell if the changes it has  
 
 
176 Jaime Ravinet, "Reemplazo de la Ley del Cobre y la Defensa Nacional," El Mercurio, September 
27, 2009. 
177 Ibid. 
178 José Luis Riffo M., "Pasado, presente y futuro de la Ley Reservada del Cobre," Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile, September 23, 2009, http://www.bcn.cl/carpeta_temas_profundidad/ley-
reservada-cobre (accessed June 10, 2010). 
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wrought will bring any real strengthening of the minister’s power.  In any event, though, 
the mere passage of this bill is indicative of a positive and formalized trend toward 
stronger civilian control of the military. 
3. Extra-Legal Factors 
The final category of items considered in Table 2, extra-legal factors, is perhaps 
the most difficult to explain with any assurance of accuracy.  Sitting beyond the direct 
control of any individual or organization, it is difficult to pinpoint any single factor as the 
most important in changing them.  Nevertheless, two items stand out as having produced 
the mixed levels of progress indicated in the table.  First, the significant progress noted in 
relation to the internationalist worldview and the lack of military contestation are 
indicative, in part, of the broader generational shift that naturally occurs in any 
organization.  The armed forces are not a simple “black box,” as this study has treated 
them up to this point.  In reality, of course, the military is made up of individuals with 
experiences and beliefs that are at turns both unique and shared across generations, 
socioeconomic classes, or other groups.  Since 1990, it will come as no surprise that the 
make-up of the Chilean military has changed slowly but constantly, to the point that only 
a minority of the men and women who served under Pinochet remain in service today.179  
The rest, quite obviously, entered the armed forces under a democratic regime.  It would 
be unrealistic to presume that Pinochet’s influence disappeared upon his death in 2004, 
but it would be equally naïve to expect that his iconic status has remained constant.  
Irrespective of Pinochet’s influence, all of the servicemembers in today’s Chilean armed 
forces have been imbued with the more modern sense of the military’s role in the nation’s 
defense.  The internationalist attitudes of so many civilians and officers, contrasting so 
sharply with attitudes prior to 1990 (and even into the 1990s and 2000s), provide further 
evidence of this phenomenon.  The ongoing lack of public acts of military contestation 
sends a powerful signal not just to the public, but also to the younger members of the 
armed services, thereby reinforcing this generational trend. 
 
179 As of 2008, “only six of those in the army at the time of the 1973 coup remain in service.” (See 
The Economist, "A force for good, for now.") 
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Whether such progress will be seen in the still-traditional modes of identity 
applied to members of Chile’s armed forces remains to be seen.  Geopolitics also appears 
to be weathering the gradual generational upheaval more or less intact.  It seems most 
likely that such views, proclaimed from on high in the defense white papers and 
elsewhere, are unlikely to retreat from their current level of influence any time soon.  
Why is it that these two vestiges of weak civilian control remain so strong while the other 
extra-legal factors have improved so much?  To begin with, both geopolitics and 
traditional forms of military identity were powerful trends in Chile long before Pinochet 
even joined the army.  As has been discussed, both of these are deeply embedded in the 
Chilean psyche and have remained so through all sorts of historical transitions.  It will 
take much more than the mere passage of time and the presence of a vibrant democracy 
to temper these emotion-laden and nationalistic modes of thinking.  This is not to say that 
nothing can be done to move this process along.  Civilian leaders can and should pursue 
legislation, defense policy, and foreign policy that will reinforce the trend away from 
these closely interrelated phenomena.  Indeed, as was discussed in the section on 
international peacekeeping, some analysts have argued that just such a process has been 
underway in Chile for at least the past decade.  Nevertheless, as the last two examples 
from the above analysis of the Copper Law indicate, there are plenty of members of the 
civilian political class who themselves hold onto these sorts of views, not the least of 
which is the current Minister of Defense. 
It therefore is interesting to note that, among all the measures of civilian control 
of the military assessed in this paper, none is more influenced by the path-dependency 
put in motion by the modes of transition than are these two extra-legal factors.  This is 
noteworthy because none of the modes-of-transition literature directly addresses either 
geopolitics or military identity.  Being primarily institutionalist in their approach, these 
authors focused instead on the measures from the other two categories in Table 2.  Yet 
both of the other two factors with the least progress (the regimes of exception and the 
Copper Law) are in many ways connected to the question of Chile’s perception of its own 
geopolitical situation and of the appropriate manner of employment for the armed forces.  
As an area for future study, it would be worthwhile to better understand the trajectory of 
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these two vestiges over the course of Chilean history, with the aim of predicting their 
future influence on policy-making in general and on civil-military relations in particular. 
C. ASSESSING THE PREDICTIONS 
Did the predictions get it right?  Was the pessimism and skepticism in the modes-
of-transition literature well founded?  Did the electoral dynamics school see something 
that others missed?  In a sense, these may not be the right questions to ask; the answer to 
both questions is “yes.”  It may be useful, instead, to inquire as to what both schools 
overlooked.  Scholars who emphasized the importance of the modes of transition largely 
underplayed, or even ignored, the power of elected civilians to modify the rules of the 
game that hemmed them in.  These analysts also discounted the critical importance of the 
legacies of geopolitics and traditional military identity and how these two issues might 
play into the evolution of civilian control.  The electoral dynamics framework, on the 
other hand, did not sufficiently acknowledge that the same rational decisions that could 
so powerfully drive the progress toward democratic consolidation might also inhibit the 
very same progress. 
Those observers who saw a low probability of successful democratic 
consolidation in 1990s Chile had good reason to be skeptical.  Many of the most 
troubling aspects of the military dictatorship remained very much in effect even after 
President Aylwin’s inauguration.  At least as troubling was that Pinochet still held an 
amount of power that was ludicrous in light of his status as a deposed dictator.   His 
scheduled move from command of the army to a waiting seat on the senate floor in 1998, 
“an act of great symbolic violence” in the eyes of some,180 only promised to extend his 
influence indefinitely.  A lack of progress in tackling the difficult reconciliation needed in 
the wake of so many human rights violations was only exacerbated by the contentious 
cases of General Contreras and the Rettig Report, not to mention the disturbing boinazo 
and ejercicio de enlace affairs.  To conclude, as the modes-of-transition scholars did, 
from this overwhelmingly negative evidence that a strong Chilean democracy was not in 
the cards is quite justified. 
 
180 Garretón, "Chile 1997–1998: The Revenge of Incomplete Democratization," 261. 
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In contrast, for anyone to have predicted otherwise seems, on the face of it, to 
have required an enormous faith in the power of electoral politics, if not a certain 
suspension of disbelief.  A closer reading of the work by authors like Hunter and Fuentes, 
however, makes it quite obvious that neither of them was looking through rose-colored 
glasses as they studied Chile in the postauthoritarian era.  In fact, both of them fully 
acknowledge and analyze the difficulties facing Chile’s democratic consolidation.181  
The key distinction in their work, of course, is not a lack of hardnosed realism in their 
assessment of the challenges facing Chile; it is merely that they each recognize that those 
challenges are not set in stone.  Indeed, the rules of the game resulting from the pacted 
transition were themselves the result of a series of negotiations.  Electoral dynamics 
logically extends this fact to argue that those negotiations are, in a sense, never-ending in 
the context of an electoral democracy.  Put simply, politicians will, as time goes on, 
continually reshape those rules, eliminating them and adding new ones as the situation 
might require or desire, in an infinite series of rational calculations aimed primarily at 
keeping oneself in power. 
The evolution of civil-military relations in Chile has shown that the predictions of 
both the electoral dynamics and the modes-of-transition frameworks were modulated in a 
number of ways.  Electoral dynamics, in a sense, contains the seeds of its own potential 
failures, insofar as the key variable is the presence or absence of incentives for change.  
In several of the measures discussed in this study, the lack of incentives has ensured that 
crucial vestiges remain in place, even after twenty have gone by.  In its focus on the 
founding conditions, the modes-of-transition literature, for its part, tended to downplay 
the single greatest factor that has contributed to the successes that have been achieved to 
date in Chile, the same electoral dynamics.  Interestingly, had these scholars chosen to 
address geopolitics and military identity in their assessments, it seems likely they would 
have only found even greater justification for their pessimism. 
What neither the modes-of-transition nor the electoral dynamics framework 
includes in its expectation is the fact that whatever critical juncture one chooses as a 
 
181 For a particularly damning analysis of Chile’s slow progress, see Claudio Fuentes, "Resisting 
change: security-sector reform in Chile," Conflict, Security & Development 2, no. 1 (2002): 121–131. 
 77
starting-off point is bound to be followed by other critical junctures.  The reason for this 
omission is obvious enough:  those critical junctures, being profound changes to existing 
conditions, are generally totally unpredictable.  Just as no one foresaw that Augusto 
Pinochet would leave office back in 1980, this study could find no predictions of the 
arrest of the former dictator, nor of Chile’s coming economic success. 
In the end, though, the crucial question that has determined the bulk of the 
generally impressive progress so far achieved in Chile has been whether or not the 
incentives exist to motivate civilian leaders to seek the reforms and actions that will 
contribute to effective civil-military relations.  Rarely will a politician pursue stronger 
civilian control of the armed forces for its own sake.  Rhetoric aside, it is difficult to 
make the case that any of the modifications to Chilean laws and policies that have 
contributed to the generally effective level of political management were made on such 
an ideological basis.  Just as important, there are issues that are beyond the reach of 
electoral dynamics.  Even Pinochet cannot be given full credit for intentionally shaping 
the powerful legacies of military identity and geopolitics that were present in 1973, in 
1990, or even today.  The forces at play in shaping these facets of civil-military relations, 
be they generational, educational, or cultural, are far too complex to be reined in by the 
government.  Only time will allow for their continued evolution toward effective support 
for strong civil-military relations and a fully consolidated democracy, but there is no 
guarantee even of this. 
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